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APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES PATENT




In November of 1989, a paper bearing the brief and unremark-
able title "Protein Crystal Growth in Microgravity" appeared in the
weekly journal Science.1 Although authored by an imposing panel
of twenty-four scientists, the paper itself was brief, only a little over
three pages long. The text of the paper confined itself to a discus-
sion of the arcana of x-ray crystallography, and the article might
have gone largely unnoticed to those outside that discipline. Cer-
tainly there seemed little in the paper that might attract the atten-
tion of lawyers, judges, legislators, or others concerned with
fashioning public policy or law.
Yet behind its technical jargon, the brief paper in Science con-
tains data with important implications for those who shape Ameri-
can law, particularly for those who shape the law concerning
intellectual property. The paper has already come to the attention
of the national legislature through recent congressional testimony
and through reports drafted to accompany pending federal legisla-
tion.2 The data within the paper could have a profound impact on
United States industrial policy, on American competitiveness in in-
ternational markets, on relationships with the United States' allies
and trading partners, and on the health and welfare of the world
population generally. Most importantly, the Science paper dramati-
cally underscores the recurrent failure of the United States Con-
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1. DeLucas, Protein Crystal Growth in Microgravity, 246 SCIENCE 651 (1989).
2. See Patents in Space: Hearings on HR. 2946 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intel-
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gress to take decisive action with regard to the patenting of
inventions arising out of commercial activity in outer space.
This article addresses the legal issues raised by the application
of United States patent law to commercial activity in outer space.
These issues implicate certain aspects of international law as applied
to the use of space, as well as judicial interpretation of the patent
law and legislative action taken by Congress.
Part I of this article reviews the United States policy encourag-
ing commercial activity in outer space, the administrative response
to this policy from the National Aeronautic and Space Administra-
tion (NASA), and the implications for that policy from the recent
protein crystal growth experiments conducted aboard the Space
Transportation System (STS or space shuttle). Part I concludes
that the policy of encouraging commercial activity in outer space
necessarily entails some form of patent protection for inventions de-
veloped there.
Part II discusses the application of United States patent law to
commercial activity in outer space. Specifically, attention will focus
upon principles of international law and of domestic intellectual
property law. Part II concludes that, under the present state of the
law, United States patent protection for outer space innovation is at
best uncertain, and in some instances may be lacking altogether.
Part III examines legislative initiatives that have been intro-
duced to correct this problem, and the manner in which these initia-
tives have evolved to address the concerns of the international
community. Part III suggests that the outer space patent legislation
most recently before Congress is a step in the proper direction, but
only the first step in addressing the concern of intellectual property
protection in outer space. Finally, this article concludes that enact-
ment of outer space patent legislation is imperative to the continued
encouragement of commercial activity in outer space, and suggests
several additional items in this area that will need to be addressed
by Congress in the near future.
II. THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF SPACE
The legal questions surrounding patents in outer space are an
integral part of the recent movement toward private commercial ac-
tivity in outer space. This privatization movement is itself the result
of interacting political and economic trends. Some understanding
of these trends is therefore necessary to any discussion of patents in
space; this section accordingly outlines the basic governmental poli-
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cies and scientific facts supporting the legal analysis undertaken in
Part II below.
A. The Policy of Commercialization
Space-related activities are expected by some to generate be-
tween $100-200 billion in revenues annually by the year 2000.' The
possibility of such profits would be attractive to private industry
under any circumstances, but the opportunities to realize these prof-
its are the result of favorable regulatory and administrative actions.
Over the last decade, the United States government has surrendered
its exclusive role in many commercial outer space markets.4 This
general retreat from positions of governmental monopoly on com-
mercial outer space activity has fostered a climate conducive to pri-
vate commercial outer space activity, which in turn has given rise to
the questions of patent protection discussed in this article. The
overall movement toward privatization and commercialization of
outer space ventures was largely initiated by the declaration and
implementation of a commercial space policy by the executive
branch, as outlined in the next section.
1. Executive policy
Much of the early attention on commercial activity in outer
space resulted from the initial successes of the United States' Space
Transport System, or space shuttle.5 Early and perhaps overly opti-
mistic evaluations of the shuttle suggested that its reusable nature
would allow cheaper and easier access to outer space activity.6 The
prospect of a new era in commercial space activity focused consid-
erable attention on the opportunities available in the microgravity
and vacuum of earth orbit.
These possibilities quickly came to the attention of the execu-
tive branch, and outer space policy was soon incorporated into the
3. See Osborn, Business in Space, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1985, at 45, 51,
reprinted in Patents in Space: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 51
(1985) [hereinafter 1985 Hearing].
4. See Marshall, Commercialization of Space. Incentives, Impediments, and Alterna-
tives, 12 J. SPACE L. 163, 163-64, 170-73 (1984); see also Reynolds & Merges, Toward an
Industrial Policy for Outer Space." Problems and Prospects of the Commercial Launch Indus-
try, 29 JURIMETRICS J. 7, 13, 15 (1988) (discussing "the deregulation, or privatization, move-
ment come to space").
5. Flasjer, Tax Law and Business Investments in Space: Taking Steps Towards Reduc-
ing the Risks, in 3 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE, THE LAW, AND THE COMMERCIAL USE OF
SPACE 91-93 (P. Mink ed. 1987) [hereinafter AMERICAN ENTERPRISE].
6. Id. at 93.
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Reagan administration's overall drive toward government deregula-
tion, or privatization, of various markets.7 As early as 1982, Presi-
dent Reagan announced the intention of his administration to foster
a climate conducive to increased private-sector investment and in-
volvement in space activities.' Under this policy, government
would play a regulatory and supervisory role, rather than an active
commercial role. This policy was also prominent in the President's
1984 State of the Union address, wherein he called for development
of a permanent manned space station.9 Later in 1984, during a cer-
emony marking the 15th anniversary of the Apollo lunar landing,
the President reaffirmed and refined the outline of this space policy:
I also said in that [January 1984] State of the Union address that
we would soon develop initiatives to help promote private sector
investment in space, and we're now embarking on that course.
We'll do all we can to ensure that industry has routine access to
space and a suitable, reliable place to work there. And we'll do
this without needless regulatory constraints. 10
This policy was implemented through organization of special
high-level working groups and a special task force that reviewed
past policy and regulations, then made specific recommendations on
the changes needed to encourage private commercial activity in
space."1 The recommended changes included alteration or elimina-
tion of specific laws and regulations discriminating against commer-
cial space ventures, introducing new laws and regulations creating
private space venture incentives, and privatizing certain govern-
ment-dominated space activities.2 The Reagan administration, in
concert with Congress, made significant strides toward realizing
these stated objectives, and the process has continued under the
present administration. President Bush recently reaffirmed the gov-
ernment's commitment to construction of a permanently manned
space station, and called for eventual construction of a permanent
7. Id at 93-94; Heffman, Patents in Space: Encouraging and Protecting Out-of-this-
World Investments, in AMERICAN ENTERPRISE, supra note 5, at 115, 116; Reynolds &
Merges, supra note 4.
8. Flasjer, supra note 5, at 93.
9. The State of the Union: Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of Congress, 20
Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 87, 90 (January 25, 1984) [hereinafter State of the Union].
10. Space Exploration Day, 1984: Remarks at a White House Ceremony Marking the
15th Anniversary of the Apollo Lunar Landing, 20 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1048, 1048-49
(July 20, 1984).
11. See Flasjer, supra note 5, at 94.
12. See National Policy on the Commercial Use of Space, White House Fact Sheet, July
20, 1984, reprinted in Flasjer, supra note 5, at 110-11.
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moon base. 13
2. Steps toward privatization
Congressional response to these executive branch pronounce-
ments has for the most part been favorable. In addition to Congres-
sional hearings and reports encouraging private investment in outer
space ventures, Congress enacted two concrete items of legislation
that endorsed the privatization movement.14 The first of these, the
Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act, provided for a
phased transfer of the government's remote sensing satellite opera-
tion, or Landsat, to the private sector." The Remote Sensing Act
initially provided for a private contractor to begin marketing the
remote sensing data gathered by the governmental satellite system,
and contemplates eventual private operation of a Landsat system,
with the governmental role confined to regulation. 6 The Act there-
fore represents an important model in defining the relationship be-
tween private and governmental interests in commercial space
activity. 17
The second Congressional action fostering an atmosphere of
privatization was the Commercial Space Launch Act.'" Even
before the Challenger space shuttle tragedy, demand for space
launch services had outstripped NASA's ability to supply such serv-
ices. 19 Private firms began to investigate the space launch market,
and this movement received Congressional approval under the
Space Launch Act.2' This legislation explicitly encouraged private
concerns to develop commercial alternatives to NASA's space
launch services.21 The Act also created an Office of Commercial
Space Transportation within the Department of Transportation as a
bureau overseeing all commercial space launches.22 This office
quickly became significant as a focal point for advocates of space
privatization, leading to policy decisions such as subsidies for pri-
vate launch insurance and executive branch endorsement of pri-
13. See Remarks on the 20th Anniversary of the Apollo Moon Landing, 25 Weekly
Comp. Pres. Doc. 1128, 1129 (July 20, 1989).
14. See Flasjer, supra note 5, at 96-97 (discussing congressional encouragement of pri-
vate commercial activity).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 4201 (1988).
16. See Helfman, supra note 7, at 117-18; Flasjer, supra note 5, at 95-96.
17. See Helfman, supra note 7, at 117.
18. 49 U.S.C.A. § 2601 (West Supp. 1988).
19. Reynolds & Merges, supra note 4, at 14-15.
20. See Flasjer, supra note 5, at 96.
21. See Hellfman, supra note 7, at 120-21; Reynolds & Merges, supra note 4, at 15.
22. See Reynolds & Merges, supra note 4, at 15.
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vately-owned industrial space projects proposed during the late
1980s.23
Other fortuitous events combined with formal governmental
action to encourage private entry into commercial outer space mar-
kets. The most significant among these unforeseen events was the
explosion of the space shuttle Challenger, an event that prompted a
reevaluation of the American space program.24 Ironically, the fail-
ure of the space shuttle did perhaps as much to encourage private
entry into outer space markets as did the shuttle's development.
The Challenger disaster revealed the folly of depending too heavily
upon one outer space transport system, and as a result, private firms
took an increased interest in entering the space launch market.25 In
addition, the shuttle tragedy prompted the Reagan administration
to ease NASA out of the commercial satellite launch business,
opening new opportunities for private enterprise.26
This combination of governmental policy, legislative action,
and historical forces allowed private entry into outer space markets,
such as remote sensing and space launch services, that were already
in existence, but were restricted. The overall atmosphere of priva-
tization has also encouraged research into the development of new
space-related markets, the most significant of which is expected to
be industrial manufacturing in outer space.27 The prospects of such
manufacturing ventures have captured the attention of private firms
for the reasons outlined in the next section.
B. Benefits of Commercialization
The first commercial product manufactured in space is already
for sale: billions of tiny, perfectly spherical polystyrene beads manu-
factured aboard the United States space shuttle.28 Each of the
beads is exactly ten microns in diameter, making them useful as a
measurement standard for counting red blood cells, measuring par-
ticulate pollution, or calibrating certain types of industrial ma-
chines.2 9 Because theseltiny spheres were produced in outer space,
23. Id. at 15-16.
24. Id.
25. Id at 14-15.
26. See Heffinan, supra note 7, at 120-21.
27. See G. REYNOLDS & R. MERGES, OUTER SPACE: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY
13-14 (1989).
28. See Osborn, supra note 3, at 47; see also Foley & Scoular, "Made in Space"-
International Legal Aspects of Manufacturing in Outer Space, SPACE: LEGAL AND COMMER-
CIAL ISSUES 105, 108-09 (1986).
29. See Osborn, supra note 3, at 47.
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beyond the reach of strong gravitational effects, they contain none
of the size or shape distortions that gravity may induce.3" These
spheres are the first example of a product taking advantage of this
characteristic of the outer space manufacturing environment. How-
ever, outer space manufacturing holds the promise of even more
significant benefits, particularly in the area of materials .processing.
1. Materials processing in space
Materials processing is the science of developing new combina-
tions of matter to benefit human society.31 Although materials
processing in some form extends back to the dawn of civilization,
recent progress in chemistry and related sciences have revolution-
ized the design and manufacture of alloys, polymers, ceramics, and
other useful materials.32 Industries that are heavily dependent upon
materials science are expected to benefit from research and manu-
facture conducted in the unique environment of outer space. 3
Outer space offers two manufacturing advantages that can be found
nowhere on earth: microgravity and vacuum.34 Conditions in outer
space have been described by some as "weightless," but in fact small
gravitational effects, or "microgravity" can be measured. 35 How-
ever, outer space unquestionably offers the opportunity to minimize
the detrimental effect of gravity in certain manufacturing processes.
In addition, the ambient gas concentrations in outer space are van-
ishingly small compared to earth atmosphere.36 Some industrial
processes require sophisticated vacuum pumps to remove unwanted
gasses; implementation of these processes in outer space promises
increased benefits in manufacturing purity.37
For example, the computer and electronics industries make use
of integrated circuit chips constructed from layers of various con-
ducting, insulating, and semiconducting materials. 38 The manufac-
ture of these composite chips is dependent upon the production of
30. Id.
31. See Good, Preface, in BIOTECHNOLOGY AND MATERIALS SCIENCE xiil (M. Good
ed. 1988) [hereinafter BIOTECHNOLOGY].
32. See Slichter, Chemical Research in Materials Science, in BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra
note 31, at 63-64.
33. See G. REYNOLDS & R. MERGES, supra note 27.
34. Id.; see also Foley & Scoular, supra note 28, at 107.
35. See G. REYNOLDS & R. MERGES, supra note 27.
36. Id.
37. IM.
38. See Whitesides, Materials for Advanced Electronic Devices, in BIOTECHNOLOGY,
supra note 31, at 85-87.
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high quality layers of crystalline silicon.3 9 The art of growing large,
high-quality silicon crystals is well advanced, but the slightest dis-
turbance may flaw the crystalline wafer structure.40 Consequently,
the production of silicon wafers may well be significantly enhanced
if carried out in the microgravity of outer space. In addition, chem-
ists have known for several years that the speed and efficiency of
semiconductor chips could be greatly improved if gallium arsenide,
rather than silicon, could be economically used.41 Unfortunately,
large gallium arsenide crystals are notoriously difficult to grow
without defects.42 The production of such crystals may be another
fruitful area for outer space experimentation. However, the most
recent and exciting implications for outer space research and manu-
facturing arise out of the protein crystallization experiments men-
tioned at the beginning of this article.
2. Understanding microgravity protein crystallization
The benefits from outer space materials processing discussed
above are still largely speculative, but the results of recent outer
space experiments in protein crystallization indicate that the first
fruits of outer space commercialization may be realized in the area
of biotechnology. Microgravity protein crystallization is an early
example of an outer space process that promises to yield commer-
cial results.4" To understand the significance of these experiments
and their impact upon United States policy on outer space patent-
ing, an elementary understanding of x-ray crystallography and pro-
tein engineering is required.
Although the science of physical biochemistry offers a variety
of methods that contribute to elucidating molecular structure, the
most important technique is that of x-ray diffraction. To determine
molecular structure by x-ray diffraction, a stream of x-rays is fired
toward a pure crystal of the substance being studied.' The atoms in
the crystal lattice will absorb some of the x-rays, then re-emit, or
diffract, the radiation at a different angle.45 Each re-emitted x-ray
will form a spot on film placed near the crystal.46 Each atom will
39. Id. at 92.
40. See id.; Goddard, Simulation of Atoms and Molecules, in BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra
note 31, at 72.
41. Whitesides, supra note 38, at 90-92.
42. Id.
43. See Report, supra note 2, at 30.
44. See D. SHERWOOD, CRYSTALS, X-RAYs AND PROTEINS 314 (1976).
45. Id. at 314 (discussing Bragg's Law, which relates the angles of incidence and
diffraction).
46. Id at 500.
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diffract x-rays at a variety of angles, giving rise to a variety of spots
that mark the position of that atom.47 By studying the spots on the
film, researchers can mathematically calculate the position of the
atom that emitted the radiation, and thereby build up a three di-
mensional picture of the internal structure of the crystal.4 Often,
computer imaging will be used to give a graphic representation of
the data gathered in this manner.49 These three dimensional images
allow researchers to see visually how the structure of the molecule
studied might fit together with other molecules.
In order to obtain the best data from x-ray diffraction studies,
researchers must use large, relatively flawless crystals of the sub-
stance studied.5° Any imperfection or impurity in the regular order
of the crystal lattice will create difficulty in calculating the positions
of the atoms in the molecule of interest.51 If the positions of the
atoms are unclear, the structure of the molecule will be unclear. If
this is thought of in terms of an analogy to conventional photogra-
phy, we might say that the "picture" of the molecule that emerges
from the x-ray diffraction data will be "sharper" if the crystal used
is large and regular. By the same token, the "picture" will be
"fuzzy" or "out of focus" if the crystal is small or flawed.
Unfortunately, large, regularly ordered protein crystals are dif-
ficult to grow in earth's strong gravitational field.52 Protein crystals
are grown in solutions supersaturated with the particular protein. 3
The protein is usually more dense than water. 4 As protein mole-
cules precipitate out of the solution onto a growing crystal, the re-
maining fluid decreases in density, and gravitational forces create a
flow away from the crystal. 5 This convection stirs the solution and
disrupts the orderly growth of the crystal by causing some parts to
grow faster than others. 6 In addition, this gravitational stirring ef-
fect may cause many small crystals to begin growing at different
points in the solution.57 Gravity causes sedimentation of these
47. In actuality, the film displays an inverse image of the crystalline structure called the
"Reciprocal Lattice". The actual structure, or "Real Lattice," may be calculated from this
data by means of the Fourier transform. Id. at 260.
48. Id.
49. See Goddard, supra note 40, at 71-72.
50. See D. SHERWOOD, supra note 44, at 523-26 (discussing the effects of disorder in
the lattice).
51. Id.
52. See Pool, Zero Gravity Produces Weighty Improvements, 246 SCIENCE 580 (1989).
53. Id
54. Id.
55. Id.; see also Osborne, supra note 3, at 47.
56. See Pool, supra note 52.
57. Id.
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small crystals and inhibits the growth of large crystals.5"
The recent experiments aboard the United States space shuttle
demonstrate that these problems can be alleviated by growing the
crystals in the microgravity of outer space. Microgravity crystalli-
zation of three types of protein yielded larger and better ordered
crystals than were obtained by using the same method in control
tests on earth.5 9 One of the proteins studied was elastase, which
mediates the respiratory disease emphysema."° X-ray diffraction
studies performed with the space-grown elastase crystals yielded
twice as many data points as any earth-grown elastase crystal.6 '
The space-grown crystals thus yielded much higher resolution data,
and therefore permitted a much more precise image of the protein
structure to be formed. This should contribute greatly to studies of
elastase inhibitors for the treatment of emphysema.
The two other protein crystals that grew more favorably in
outer space promise similarly exciting prospects for biotechnologi-
cal research. One of the proteins crystalized, isocitrate lyase, is an
important enzyme in the biochemistry of parasites called nema-
todes.62 These parasitic worms are responsible for a variety of
debilitating diseases in humans, in other animals, and even in
plants.63 An enhanced understanding of the structure of isocitrate
lyase will lead to the design of inhibitor molecules that could kill
the parasites without harming an infected host. The final space-
crystalized protein, y-interferon, is a genetically engineered form of
a protein secreted by human cells to combat cancer.64 A precise
understanding of its structure may lead to the production of effec-
tive anti-cancer drugs. Consequently, the data from these outer
space experiments have both scientific and economic importance.
58. Id
59. See 1989 Hearing, supra note 2, at 30 (written statement of Charles E. Bugg).
60. See Petsko, Protein Engineering, in BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 31, at 53, 56-57.
The human lung is composed largely of a stretchable structural protein called elastin; the
body removes old elastin by breaking it down with the enzyme elastase. Normally, elastase is
controlled by inhibitor molecules, called antitrypsin, that block the elastase active site "like a
cork in a bottle." Id However, certain chemicals, such as those found in cigarette smoke,
can modify the inhibitors so that they no longer fit into the elastase active site, leaving the
enzyme free to chew up the lungs like a "biological Pac-man." Id. This condition produces
the fatal symptoms of emphysema. Protein engineers investigate the structures of elastase
and antitrypsin in hopes of producing modification-resistant inhibitors to treat emphysema.
Id.; Pool, supra note 52.
61. See Pool, supra note 52; see also DeLucas, supra note 1, at 652.
62. pool, supra note 52.
63. See generally Weatherby, Medical Helminthology in ZINSSER MICROBIOLOGY,
1232-52 (W. Joklik, H. Willett & D. Amos eds. 1984).
64. See DeLucas, supra note 1, at 652; Pool, supra note 52.
[Vol. 6
OUTER SPACE PITENT L4W
3. Biotechnology in outer space
Although the data obtained from the space-grown crystals
would be worthwhile simply from the standpoint of increasing sci-
entific knowledge, the data also has direct applications for the
American biotechnology industry. The United States has seen the
recent and vigorous growth of a domestic biotechnology industry;
worldwide sales of the products of this industry are expected to
reach at least $15 billion annually by the year 2000.65 American
biotechnology companies are using the data from the outer space
process described here to create marketable products that will fight
diseases. The availability of such products represents not only a
significant opportunity for improving human health and welfare,
but a boon to American competitiveness and trade. Biotechnology
is one area where the United States is recognized to still maintain a
significant superiority over the rest of the world; the development of
new products from this outer space process will help to ensure that
lead.
This superiority, however, will only occur if the use of the pre-
viously described process remains under the control of the Ameri-
can firms that invested in its development. The protein
crystallization process described here appears to be the proper sub-
ject matter of a United States patent, which would reserve to the
inventors of the process the right to use the process.66
Congress has already recognized the importance of promoting
and fostering the domestic biotechnology industry through strong
patent protection, 67 and this policy would seem to be all the more
important where outer space research is concerned. It is generally
agreed that the availability of patent protection is critical to contin-
ued commercial investment in outer space.68 Patents must be avail-
able to assure private firms a return on investments in outer space
research; if such protection is not available, firms will be under-
65. UNrrED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMIN-
ISTRATION, HIGH PROFILE INDUSTRIES: PROFILES AND OUTLOOKS, BIOTECHNOLOGY 47
(1984).
66. See 1989 Hearing, supra note 2, at 30 (written statement of Charles E. Bugg) ("The
crystals grown in space are obtained using unique processes that will be patented.")
67. For example, the Process Patent Amendment Act, Pub. L. 100-418, Aug. 23, 1988,
was enacted in large measure to protect American biotechnology companies from extraterri-
torial patent infringers. See S. REP. No. 83, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1987); see also Process
Patent Legislation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of
the Senate Judiciary Comm., 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 22 (1987) (statement of Senator
Lautenberg) (legislation needed to protect biotechnology industry).
68. See Foley & Scoular, supra note 28, at 127 ("The intellectual property of the space
manufacturer is his lifeblood.")
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standably reluctant to engage in high-cost outer space ventures. 9
In the biotechnology industry, where initial investment is already
high and research and development costs may consume more than
40% of a firm's expected revenues, the assurance of patent protec-
tion seems especially important.70 This need may be partially ad-
dressed through arrangements with the National Aeronautic and
Space Administration (NASA), discussed in the next section. How-
ever, as discussed in Part II, there exist very real concerns over the
applicability of United States patent law to outer space activity, and
these concerns may well curtail private investment in the type of
research previously described.
C. The Administrative Response
The response from NASA has been crucial to implementing
the executive branch policy of outer space commercialization dis-
cussed in section A above. Immediately following the President's
1984 State of the Union message, NASA administrators announced
administrative goals designed to encourage private investment in
space activity by reducing the technical, financial, and institutional
risks associated with private entry into this area.71 These goals have
been implemented through a variety of NASA programs, including
the offering of reduced-rate space transportation, encouragement of
joint ventures between NASA and private industry, and funding of
outer space research aimed at commercial applications. 72
1. NASA and private outer space research
Out of these various efforts to encourage private investment in
space activity, the most likely to generate patentable discoveries,
and hence the most relevant to the discussion here, are the NASA
programs to stimulate research in materials processing.7 3 Under its
69. See HR. 4316 and HR. 3112: Inventions in Outer Space: Hearing Before the Space
Science and Applications Subcomm. of the House Comm on Science and Technology, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Hearing] (statement of Michael Kirk, Assis-
tant Commissioner for External Affairs, United States Patent and Trademark Oftice)(patent
uncertainty likely to deter outer space investment); Letter from John F. Murphy, Assistant
Administrator for Legislative Affairs, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, to
Senator Joseph Biden, Chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary (April 7, 1987) (copy
on file with author) (stressing importance of intellectual property certainty to outer space
policy).
70. See UNITED STATES CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEw DE-
VELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: U.S. INVESTMENT IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 80 (1988).
71. See Flasjer, supra note 5, at 94-95.
72. See Helfman, supra note 7, at 116.
73. Id. at 117, 121-23; see also UNITED STATES CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
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Industry Guest Investigatory Agreement (IGI), NASA has aided
private firms in pursuing academic exploratory research.74 Under
its Technical Exchange Agreement program, NASA has made its
ground facilities available to researchers funded by private indus-
try.7" Most importantly, NASA has facilitated space research by
private firms through its Joint Endeavor Agreement program.76
Through JEA agreements, NASA provides free outer space trans-
port, and the private firm provides the experimental apparatus."
NASA and the private party share the costs and risks of the venture
until it becomes commercially viable, at which time it is anticipated
that the private concern will begin to pay for the space flights.78
2. Allocating the patent rights
As the recent protein crystallization experiments indicate, re-
search programs involving NASA and private industry are already
beginning to bear some fruit.7 9 The allocation of patent rights stem-
ming from this type of discovery is therefore becoming a matter of
pressing concern. Under current law, NASA has a strong statutory
claim to any intellectual property generated from its joint research
programs. For example, under section 305 of the 1958 National
Aeronautics and Space Act, Congress provided that "[w]henever
any invention is made in the performance of any work under any
contract of the Administration [NASA],... such invention shall be
the exclusive property of the United States... unless the Adminis-
tration [NASA] waives all or any part of the rights [thereto].... ,8"
Enforcement of this provision is placed in the hands of the Commis-
sioner of Patents, pursuant to his review of patent applications.81
No patent may be issued to a private applicant for an invention that
may have significant utility in conducting aeronautical or space ac-
tivities, unless the applicant first complies with special procedures
demonstrating that the invention was not the result of a NASA
ASSESSMENT, SPACE STATIONS AND THE LAW: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES - BACKGROUND
PAPER 33 (1986) [hereinafter OTA BACKGROUND PAPER].
74. See Helfman, supra note 7, at 122.
75. Id
76. Id
77. Id.; 1985 Hearing, supra note 3, at 11 (statement of S. Neil Hosenball, General
Counsel, National Aeronautics and Space Administration)("We have what we call a joint
endeavor agreement, under which NASA provides the transportation free and.. .the private
company provides everything else; there's no exchange of funds.").
78. See sources cited supra notes 73 and 77.
79. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2457(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
81. Id § 2457(c).
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contract.
82
However, such appropriation of patentable discoveries would
discourage private investment in NASA's research programs. Ac-
cordingly, NASA has made use of its statutory discretion to waive
such rights and to encourage appropriate dissemination of its dis-
coveries." These privatization goals have been facilitated by adopt-
ing a restricted interpretation of the language in section 305, finding
that a "contract" for purposes of this section exists only where a
private sector firm undertakes inventive work for NASA. 4 Ven-
tures in which a private sector firm hires NASA as a contractor to
perform fully reimbursed work are deemed by the Administration
not to constitute contracts.8 In such instances, the private party
retains all rights to patentable discoveries, although NASA may
seek contractual assurances that inventions of significant public util-
ity will be made publicly available on reasonable conditions.86 Sim-
ilarly, joint ventures with private sector firms are deemed not to be
"contracts," and each party retains the rights to any inventions de-
veloped in the course of the venture.87 In its JEAs, NASA has in
some instances contractually reserved a "limited margin right" to
require the private sector party to license the technology if the party
is unable to commercially utilize significant discoveries.8" Finally,
where patent rights accrue to NASA, liberal licensing policies have
been developed to encourage private use of the technology.89
This contractual approach to the allocation of intellectual
property rights between NASA and private parties has been suc-
cessful thus far. Indeed, for any ground-based research such as that
encouraged through an IGI, this approach seems adequate. How-
ever, very real concerns about patentability exist in the case of
JEAs, where experiments are conducted in outer space.90 These
concerns stem from the possibility that United States patent law
may not in some instances cover these experiments, and, as a result,
would be unavailable as a basis for resolving patent claims and dis-
putes. Indeed, any possible problems of this sort could be exacer-
82. Id. § 2457(c) and (d).
83. Id. § 2457(f).
84. Helfinan, supra note 7, at 124.
85. 1986 Hearing, supra note 69, at 7 (statement of Robert J. Kempf, Associate General
Counsel for Patent Matters, National Aeronautics and Space Administration).
86. 1985 Hearing, supra note 3, at 12 (statement of S. Neil Hosenball).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id; see also Helfman, supra note 7, at 127-28 (listing details of NASA JEA for
metal alloying in microgravity).
90. See infra notes 95-118 and accompanying text.
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bated by the very programs discussed here. Increased commercial
activity in outer space heightens the chance for such problems to
occur. The need for certainty in the context of patentability in
outer space is expected to become even more of a problem as manu-
facturing capabilities become available aboard a permanent space
station, or as private activity without NASA involvement becomes
commonplace.91 The basis for these patent law concerns is explored
in detail in the next section.
III. PROTECTING INNOVATION IN SPACE
Under Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the United States Consti-
tution, Congress is empowered to promote the progress of science
and the useful arts by granting limited monopolies, or patents, to
inventors.92 Patents may be granted to machines, processes, articles
of manufacture, and compositions of matter that are found by ad-
ministrative review to meet criteria of novelty, utility, and non-obvi-
ousness.9 3 The holder of a patent is granted a seventeen-year
exclusive monopoly over the invention in return for disclosure of its
workings; consequently, patents are viewed as an incentive to inno-
vation, investment, and disclosure.94 It is obviously very desirable
that such an incentive be available to spur commercial investment
in outer space research. The availability of this incentive under in-
ternational and United States law is explored in this section.
A. United States Patent Protection
There are several strong arguments that suggest that present
United States patent law does not encompass many outer space ac-
tivities. Presently, 35 U.S.C. § 100 (c) provides that for purposes of
the patent law, "[t]he terms 'United States' and 'this country' mean
the United States of America, its territories and possessions."95 Ac-
cordingly, the United States Supreme Court has held that United
States patent laws have no extraterritorial effect.9 6 This poses a
problem for application of the patent laws to activity in outer space
91. See OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 73, at 28.
92. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
93. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 112 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
94. Oddly enough, these common-sense arguments as to the benefit of patent monopo-
lies have never been conclusively demonstrated. The continuing debate over the need for and
effect of patent protection has been recently reviewed at length by Eisenberg, Patent Rights
and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CmI. L. REv. 1017,
1024-45 (1989).
95. 35 U.S.C. § 100(c) (1982).
96. See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972).
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because such activity would not, in a physical sense, take place
within the geographic boundaries of the United States. Conse-
quently, unless outer space activity is considered to take place
within the United States in some juridical sense, private firms in-
vesting in outer space research and manufacturing could find them-
selves without access to the patent system in certain situations.
These situations could arise both with regard to obtaining a United
States patent and to enforcing a United States patent.
1. Obtaining a patent
Most countries in the world operate on a "first to file" patent
system, granting the patent for a particular invention to the inven-
tor who first applies.97 The United States, however, has a "first to
invent" patent system, granting the patent for a particular invention
to the inventor who first developed the innovation.98 Under the
American system, conflicts often arise as to who first invented an
item and thus who is entitled to a patent. These conflicts are re-
solved through patent interference proceedings in the United States
Patent and Trademark Office.99
In these adversarial proceedings, priority of invention is gener-
ally established by reference to key events in the invention process.
These events include conception of the invention and reduction to
practice." Conception of an invention is defined as mental formu-
lation and disclosure of the complete idea of the invention. 101 Re-
duction to practice is construction of the invention and
demonstration that it achieves its intended purposes.10 2 The general
rule for patent priority is that the person who first reduces an inven-
tion to practice will receive the patent. 103 However, if an inventor
can show prior conception of the invention, and diligence in at-
tempting to reduce the invention to practice, that inventor is consid-
ered to have priority."°
These rules of patentability pose certain problems for innova-
tions created in outer space. Under United States patent law, the
events that establish priority generally may not be proven by refer-
97. See 1 D. CHISUM, PATEN'Is § 10.00 et seq. (1988).
98. Id. § 10.01.
99. Id. § 10.02[2].
100. ,Id. § 10.01.
101. Id. § 10.04.
102. Id. § 10.06.
103. Id. § 10.03[l](a).
104. Id.
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ence to foreign activity.105 One commentator has noted that this
rule, which dates back to patent office practice from the late nine-
teenth century, was originally instituted because of the difficulty of
proving activity in foreign countries. 6 Although this may have
been sound justification for such a rule 100 years ago, the rule
makes little sense in the face of modem communication and trans-
portation technology. As a consequence, there would seem to be no
policy justification for extending such a rule to activity in outer
space. 107
A rule similar to those regarding priority applies to the patent-
ability of an invention when reviewed against prior art. In order to
be patentable, an invention must be a significant advance over previ-
ous discoveries in its particular field.108 To meet this criterion, a
patent examiner will review patent applications to determine
whether the invention in question would be obvious to a practi-
tioner in the field of the discovery. The examiner measures the in-
vention's novelty and non-obviousness by reviewing the "prior art,"
which is comprised of the previous literature and discoveries in that
field. Current United States patent law recognizes printed material
from anywhere to constitute prior art. 9 However, the patent law
recognizes tangible items as prior art only if they are previously
known, used or invented "in this country." 110 In addition, placing
an invention "in public use or on sale" more than a year before
applying for a patent renders the invention unpatentable, because
the invention effectively becomes its own prior art."' This rule of
patentability, like those regarding priority, applies only to activity
"in this country." 112
The original justification for these rules regarding prior art is
the same as that for the rule discussed above regarding priority: at
one time, the reliability of evidence concerning activity outside the
United States was questionable.' 13 Previously, these rules that dif-
ferentiated between domestic and foreign activity may have been
important in making patentability determinations. However, in a
105. 35 U.S.C. § 104 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
106. Chisum, Foreign Activity: Its Effect on Patentability Under United States Law, 11
INT'L. REV. OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AND COPYRIGHT L. 26, 28-33 (1980).
107. See 1985 Hearing, supra note 3, at 17 (statement of Donald S. Chisum, Professor of
Law, University of Washington).
108. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
109. Id. §§ 102-103.
110. Id. § 102 (a), (b), & (d).
111. Id. § 102 (b).
112. Id.
113. See Chisum, supra note 106, at 36-37, 42-43.
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modem setting, this rationale hardly seems valid when applied to
activity on earth, let alone activity in space. Indeed, these rules
could prove counterproductive to inventive activity in outer space.
One can easily imagine situations in which an inventor received a
patent for an invention that another researcher had previously in-
vestigated or used in outer space. The previous use or investigation
would constitute prior art only if the outer space setting of the pre-
vious use were considered to be "in this country." It seems counter-
intuitive to consider activity in outer space to have occurred in the
United States so that the patent would fall to the later investigator.
Private firms may well be reluctant to invest in outer space research
if they can not receive the priority of their research for purposes of
patent protection.
2. Enforcing a patent
Possession of a valid United States patent allows the patent
holder to exclude others from making, using, or selling the patented
invention." 4 Patent holders commonly license others to use their
invention, thus realizing the financial incentive for their patent dis-
closure." 5 Unauthorized making, using, or selling of a patented in-
vention constitutes infringement, creating a cause of action for
injunction or damages. However, infringement is defined as such
unauthorized use "within the United States.""' 6 Thus, it is not
clear that a patent holder could enforce his patent against someone
employing the patented invention in outer space. If activity in
space is considered to be outside the United States, then patented
inventions could be exploited by someone other than the patent
holder without the need to obtain a license. Private firms will likely
be reluctant to invest in outer space research if others may obtain
such a "free ride" off the initial firm's investment.'" 7 One commen-
tator has suggested that this might particularly become a problem
with regard to small firms or universities that do not themselves
have the resources to exploit their patents in space, and so must rely
upon licensing.1 8 Consequently, the uncertainty regarding the ex-
tent to which United States patent law may apply to commercial
activity in outer space demands prompt resolution.
114. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1982).
115. See 1985 Hearing, supra note 3, at 19 (statement of Professor Donald S. Chisum).
116. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
117. See 1985 Hearing, supra note 3, at 19 (statement of Professor Donald S. Chisum).
118. Id
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B. The Effect of International Law
In addressing the applicability of United States patent law to
outer space activity, two questions must be considered. First, is
there a valid argument by which the patent law as now constituted
might be extended to such activity? Second, may Congress validly
extend the ambit of United States patent law to outer space activity,
either under the present law or future enactments? The resolution
to each of these questions depends to some extent upon the domes-
tic law of the United States, discussed in Section C below. How-
ever, each question must first be considered against the background
of international law that defines the legal character of outer space
and hence the ability of the United States to assert jurisdiction
there.
1. The international framework
The use and exploration of outer space by humans is largely
governed by four international treaties to which the United States is
signatory. 19 The most important of these treaties is the founda-
tional Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Space, Including the Moon and Other Ce-
lestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty).120 Three other major treaties
clarify and implement various provisions of the Outer Space Treaty.
The 1968 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of
Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space
(Rescue and Return Agreement) 2 ' expands upon Articles V and
VIII of the Outer Space Treaty; the 1973 Convention on Liability
for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Liability Convention)'22 de-
rives from' Articles VII and VIII of the Outer Space Treaty; and,
finally, the 1976 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched
into Outer Space (Registration Convention) 2 3 derives from Articles
VIII and XI of the Outer Space Treaty. To the extent that these
four treaties address matters of jurisdiction and property rights in
outer space, they define the limits upon intellectual property protec-
tion in outer space.' 24 Thus, the interpretation given these treaties
119. See Helfman, supra note 7, at 132; Meyer, Protecting Inventors' Rights Aboard an
International Space Station, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 332, 334-38 (1988).
120. October 10, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
121. December 3, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S. No. 6599, 672 U.N.T.S. 119.
122. October 9, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762.
123. September 15, 1976, 28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No. 8480, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15.
124. See Helfman, supra note 7, at 132; H.R. REP. No. 788, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8
(1986)(discussing effect of international space treaties on intellectual property protection).
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will in large measure shape the ability of the United States to extend
the scope of its patent system to commercial activity in outer space.
2. Alternative views of the treaties
Unfortunately, none of the international treaties listed above
directly addresses the protection of patent rights in outer space,
and, taken together, they may actually obscure the United States'
ability to protect such rights under its own law. For example, Arti-
cle I of the Outer Space Treaty encourages international coopera-
tion in assuring scientific freedom in outer space. 125 Article II of the
treaty prohibits any nation from claiming sovereignty over areas of
outer space. 126 Article XI requires that states report the nature,
conduct, and results of space explorations to the Secretary general
of the United Nations, who will in turn widely disseminate this in-
formation.1 27 Some commentators have suggested that these treaty
provisions, when read together, could be interpreted to enunciate a
broad principle of international policy against national territoriality
in outer space. 128 Since intellectual property protection generally
derives from principles of territoriality and national sovereignty,
such protection would be inapplicable to outer space inventions and
discoveries.12 9 Under this reading of the treaty, such innovations
would be the property of all mankind, and not of any particular
person or nation.
However, this reading of the treaty is largely incompatible with
the movement toward commercialization of space; if stripped of any
exclusivity for their outer space discoveries, companies are unlikely
to invest resources in making such discoveries. In addition, the
Outer Space Treaty is not explicit about the applicability of this
principle to intellectual property discoveries in outer space, as op-
posed to real property discoveries in outer space. When examined
from this perspective, the Outer Space Treaty takes on a different
meaning, particularly if read in the context of other international
agreements. 3 ' Article I of the treaty provides that space is free for
exploration and use by all states, yet under Article VIII and under
the Registration Convention, states retain jurisdiction and control
125. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 120, at art. I.
126. d at art. II.
127. Id at art. XI.
128. See Helfinan, supra note 7, at 132-33; see also D. SMITH, SPACE STATIONS: INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 159-63 (1979)(discussing treaty basis for "common heritage"
doctrine).
129. See supra note 128.
130. See Helfman, supra note 7, at 134.
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over personnel aboard such craft.' 3 ' These treaties also specify that
ownership of objects does not change simply because they are
launched into outer space. 132 Moreover, under Article VII of the
Outer Space Treaty and under the Liability Convention, states are
liable for the damages caused by objects or personnel under their
jurisdiction and control. 133
These provisions support the proposition that outer space is
freely available for use by all, but that personal rights in tangible
property may be protected. 134 Most commentators agree that under
this "free space" approach to the international treaties, personal
rights in intangible property would be protectable as well. 1'35 This
was in essence the interpretation of the treaties adopted and relied
upon by the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of
Appeals (Appeals Board) in determining the patent rights that
could be granted for outer space inventions. In Ex Parte McKay,
the Appeals Board reversed the rejection of an application for a pat-
ent on a process that could be used only on the moon. 36 The rejec-
tion had been partially based upon the language of 35 U.S.C.
100(c), discussed above.'37 In its reversal, the Board relied upon
the jurisdiction over persons conferred by Article VIII of the Outer
Space Treaty. 38 According to the Board: "A patent grant under 35
U.S.C. § 154 by the United States for a process to be carried out on
the moon by personnel subject to its jurisdiction is thus not inimical
and at variance with the indicated section of the statute."' 39
This decision has been criticized for its reliance upon principles
of personal jurisdiction, and for this reason is discussed in Section C
below. 4° Whatever its faults, however, the McKay decision incor-
porates into its reasoning an interpretation of the international
space treaties that appears consistent with current governmental
policy on the commercialization of space. The McKay decision rec-
131. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 120, at art. VIII; Registration Convention,
supra note 123, at art. II.
132. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 120, at art. VIII; see generally Registration
Convention, supra note 123 (providing registry for identification of space objects).
133. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 120, at art. VII; Liability Convention, supra
note 122.
134. See supra note 124.
135. Id.; see also OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 73, at 18 ("Outer space is con-
sidered by most jurists to be res communis; that is, a place that is owned by no one but is free
for use by everyone.").
136. 200 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 324 (P.T.O. Bd. App. 1975).
137. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
138. McKay, 200 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) at 326.
139. Id.
140. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
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ognizes the ability of Congress to legislate with regard to personal
property rights in Outer Space, and finds such legislation compati-
ble with the United States' international obligations. If this inter-
pretation is adopted, the question then to be determined is whether
Congress has in fact so legislated with regard to the patent laws.
C. The Scope of Domestic Law
Under a "free space" reading of the international space trea-
ties, it appears that the United States may validly assert jurisdiction
over United States flag spacecraft and United States nationals. The
determination must still be made whether Congress has in fact as-
serted such jurisdiction. The touchstone for making this determina-
tion would seem to be the jurisdictional character of the patent
laws, because only certain jurisdictional rationales will be compati-
ble with the international scheme reviewed above. Although there
is as yet no well-developed body of caselaw interpreting the patent
laws in relation to outer space jurisdiction, some guidance in this
inquiry may be had from cases interpreting the patent laws with
regard to terrestrial international jurisdiction. In reviewing these
cases, however, it is important first to clearly distinguish between
the various jurisdictional rationales that states may employ.
1. Principles of jurisdiction
Under international law, various rationales may be asserted by
a particular nation as the basis of jurisdiction. These different juris-
dictional rationales both legitimate certain state actions and define
the limits upon the action that may be taken. 141 Five types of juris-
diction are generally recognized, one of which is geographic in na-
ture, one of which is personal in nature, and the remainder of which
are derived from the nature of particular acts or events. They are:
Territorial Jurisdiction, which is based upon the principle that
a state may exercise jurisdiction within the geographic bounds of its
territory;
Nationality Jurisdiction, which is based upon the principle that
states may exercise control over their own nationals, wherever they
may be;
Protective Jurisdiction, which is based upon the principle that
states may exercise control over certain acts committed by anyone,
141. See OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 73, at 25-26 n.38 (citing S. LAY & H.
TAUBENFELD, THE LAW RELATING TO AcTIvmEs OF MAN IN SPACE (1970)); 1989 Hear-
ing, supra note 2, at 47-8 (written statement of Glen H. Reynolds, Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Tennessee).
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anywhere, that would affect vital state interests, such as national
security or governmental integrity;
Universal Jurisdiction, which is based upon the principle that
states may exercise jurisdiction with respect to certain universally
condemned crimes, such as piracy or genocide, regardless of the re-
lationship of the act to a particular state; and
Passive Personality Jurisdiction, which is based upon the princi-
ple that a state may exercise jurisdiction with respect to acts com-
mitted by a foreigner outside the state's territory, when those acts
substantially affect the property or person of that state's citizens.142
Note that in the absence of specific acts that might trigger pro-
tective, universal, or passive personality jurisdiction, courts must
look to either nationality or territory as the basis for asserting juris-
diction in space. This creates something Of a problem under the
international treaties reviewed above; the treaties appear to prohibit
territorial claims in outer space.14 This process of elimination
seems to leave only nationality jurisdiction, which is problematic
where the patent law is concerned. For example, the decision of the
Appeals Board in McKay has been criticized by some commentators
as having reached the correct result through faulty reasoning.' 4
The criticism seems at least partly justified: patent laws are gener-
ally recognized to be based upon territorial jurisdiction rather than
personal jurisdiction. However, the separation between these two
types of jurisdiction is by no means clear-cut. In situations where
no nation exercises clear territorial jurisdiction, United States
courts have at times looked to nationality as a basis of jurisdiction,
and at other times looked to territorial fictions as a basis of
jurisdiction.145
These jurisdictional dilemmas have most often arisen with re-
spect to activity aboard United States craft operating on or above
142. These different rationales have received differing quanta of recognition, but nation-
ality and territorial jurisdiction are universally recognized. OTA BACKGROUND PAPER,
supra note 73, at 25-26 n.38.
143. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
144. See 1989 Hearing, supra note 2, at 51 n.14 (written statement of Professor Glen H.
Reynolds).
145. For example, an analysis parallel to that of Ex Parte McKay, deriving nationality
jurisdiction from registry, was taken by the United States Supreme Court with regard to
United States ships on the high seas in Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100
(1923)(stating that "jurisdiction... arises out of the nationality of the ship, as established by
her domicile, registry and use of the flag, and partakes... of the character of personal sover-
eity... ."). Id. at 123. The Cunard case is discussed in more detail infra notes 159-62 and
accompanying text.
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the high seas. 1" Several parallels between the law of the sea and the
law of outer space have been recognized.147 Among these are the
principles of non-appropriation, freedom of use, responsibility of
states for their acts committed in each area, and a movement to-
ward shared development of the available resources. 148 The most
important of these principles to the discussion here are the first two:
that all states enjoy freedom of use and navigation on the high seas
and the airspace above them, and that no state may exercise sover-
eignty over any portion of these areas. In addition, ships or aircraft
operating in these areas must be registered to a particular state, and
the registry forms the basis for that nation's jurisdiction over the
craft.149 As discussed above, these principles have been analogously
applied to outer space in the Outer Space Treaty. 150
Thus, both in outer space and on the high seas, craft operate in
areas where no nation may claim sovereignty, yet nations may exer-
cise jurisdiction over the craft carried on their registry. One might
reasonably inquire as to the basis of such jurisdiction. In the nor-
mal course of events, acts that might trigger protective, universal,
or passive personality jurisdiction will be absent, and such jurisdic-
tion would in any case be limited in scope to matters surrounding
the particular acts. It is by no means obvious that the craft consti-
tute "nationals" of a state for purposes of nationality jurisdiction,
146. See G. REYNOLDS & R. MERGES, supra note 27, at 254-58 (exploring problems of
jurisdiction on the high seas vis a vis problems of jurisdiction in outer space). Note that outer
space is not unique in this regard; the same questions have arisen with regard to deep-sea
mining outside of territorial waters. See Silverstein, Proprietary Protection for Deepsea Min-
ing Technology in Return for Technology Transfer: New Approach to the Seabeds Controversy,
60 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'Y 135, 148-53 (1978).
147. See Haanappel, Comparisons Between the Sea and Outer Space Law: Exploration
And Exploitation, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW
OF OUTER SPACE (1986) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS]; Note, Resolution of Legal Issues Con-
fronting the International Space Station Project: A Step Forward in the Development of Space
Law, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 745, 752 (1989) (space res communis principle similar to that in sea
law); see also Kempf, Reduction to Practice of Space Inventions, 50 . PAT. OFF. SoC'Y 105,
119 (1968) ("The analogy between space law and the law of the high seas is of many purposes
an obvious one.") But see Kopal, Analogies and Differences in the Development of the Law of
the Sea and the Law of Outer Space, in PROCEEDINGS, supra, at 151, 154 (use of each outer
space differs substantially from that of the sea); Almond, General Principles of Law: An Ap-
praisal of the Correspondence of Principles Relating to the High Seas to Outer Space, in PRO-
CEEDINGS, supra, at 118-19 (urging caution in analogizing the law of the sea to that of outer
space).
148. See Haanappel, supra note 147, at 145; OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 73,
at 22-23; CENTER FOR RESEARCH OF AIR AND SPACE LAW, SPACE ACTIvmES AND
EMERGING INTERNATIONAL LAW 167-68 (N. Matte ed. 1984)(discussing non-appropriation
and freedom of use).
149. See G. REYNOLDS & R. MERGES, supra note 27, at 255.
150. See supra notes 125-133 and accompanying text.
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nor would it seem that a nation could exercise territorial jurisdic-
tion outside its boundaries.
Where the law of the sea is concerned, some courts have re-
solved this dilemma by asserting that craft operating under the flag
of a particular nation are in effect mobile bits of that nation's terri-
tory, and therefore subject to the territorial jurisdiction of that na-
tion.'51 Under this theory, no portion of the sea or the airspace
above it would be subject to the permanent jurisdiction of the nation
of registry, only that area temporarily occupied by the registered
craft. This "floating island" theory provides one solution to the
problem of applying United States patent law to United States flag
craft; although the patent law is territorial in nature, it might be
applied to United States craft if those craft are in fact mobile bits of
United States territory.'52 This logic has in fact been applied to
United States ships in some instances, and might be applied to
United States flag spacecraft based upon the analogy between outer
space and the high seas.' However, the "floating island" theory of
jurisdiction has often been rejected in areas of the patent law, and
these decisions must be considered before relying upon such a
theory.
2. Territorial jurisdiction aboard United States flag
craft generally
During this century, United States courts have generally been
reluctant to apply territorial jurisdiction to activity aboard United
States craft on or above the high seas. In Scharrenberg v. Dollar
Steamship Co., the Supreme Court was called upon to consider this
doctrine with regard to the alien laborer statutes.15 4 Using lan-
guage similar to that of 35 U.S.C. § 100 (c), the statutes in question
prohibited the importation of contract laborers "into the United
States" and performance of such labor "in this country."' 55 Alien
seamen had been hired to work aboard a United States flag vessel,
and it was argued that this violated the alien labor laws because the
vessel was part of the United States.'56 The Court, after dismissing
the argument that the seamen employed on the ship were "labor-
ers" for purposes of the statute, held that:
151. See, eg., cases discussed infra notes 154-170 and accompanying text.
152. See idL
153. See Saragovitz, The Laws of Intellectual Property in Outer Space, 17 IDEA 86 (1975)
(adopting this rationale for spacecraft).
154. 245 U.S. 122 (1917).
155. Id. at 126.
156. IM
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Equally unallowable is the contention that a ship of American
registry engaged in foreign commerce is a part of the territory of
the United States in such a sense that men employed on it can be
said to be laboring "in the United States" or "performing labor
in this country." It is, of course, true that for the purposes of
jurisdiction a ship, even on the high seas, is often said to be a part
of the territory of the nation whose flag it flies. But in the physi-
cal sense this expression is obviously figurative, and to expand
the doctrine to the extent of treating seamen employed on such a
ship as working in the country of its registry is quite impossible
(citation omitted). 157
The Supreme Court employed similar reasoning in Cunard
Steamship Co. v. Mellon. 158 The Supreme Court in Cunard declined
to apply the 18th Amendment prohibition on liquor sales to the
decks of United States flag ships, despite language in the amend-
ment that extended the ban to "the United States and all territory
subject to the jurisdiction thereof."' 59 The Court reasoned that
there was no explicit language in the amendment that would extend
its requirements to ships on the high seas or in foreign waters. 6 °
As for the principle that the ship in question should be considered a
part of the territory of the United States, the court called this "a
figure of speech, a metaphor.... " 61 According to the Cunard
court, "[t]he jurisdiction which [this metaphor] is intended to de-
scribe arises out of the nationality of the ship, as established by her
domicile, registry and the use of the flag, and partakes more of the
characteristics of personal than territorial sovereignty." '62
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle in United States
ex rel. Clausen v. Day. 63 Citing its previous Cunard and Schar-
renberg holdings, the court held that an American vessel at sea was
not part of the United States for purposes of immigration law."
Following this lead, appellate courts have declined to apply the ter-
ritorial theory of jurisdiction to United States flag ships and air-
planes in cases concerning related areas of law. The Ninth Circuit,
for example, rejected the territorial approach in deciding certain
questions of immigration law. In Lam Mow v. Nagle,'65 the court
157. Id. at 127.
158. 262 U.S. 100 (1923), discussed supra note 145.
159. U.S. CONsr. amend. XVIII (1919, repealed 1933).
160. Cunard, 262 U.S. at 123.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. 279 U.S. 389 (1929).
164. Id. at 401.
165. 24 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1928).
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held that birth aboard an American vessel was not birth in the
United States for purposes of determining United States citizenship.
The citizenship at issue was that of a Chinese baby born to Chinese
parents on board a United States flag ship. The child would have
been entitled to citizenship under the fourteenth amendment if it
had been born "in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof," even though his parents were Chinese.16 6 The court, rely-
ing on Cunard, specifically rejected the theory that United states
registry made the vessel a travelling bit of American "territory."167
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit reasoned in Wong Ock Jee v.
Weedin 168 that a Chinese citizen who had turned twenty-one years
old aboard an American flag ship had not been within United States
territory when he attained his majority. Consequently, the court
ruled, he was not eligible for admission into the United States as a
minor child. 169 In each of these cases, the Ninth Circuit distin-
guished the territorial principle as a fiction, stating in the Wong Ock
Jee decision that "[iun a metaphorical sense a vessel upon the high
seas is sometimes spoken of as constituting a part of the territory of
the country whose flag she flies; but this is only for restricted
purposes."'
170
Where United States flag aircraft are concerned, much the
same result has been reached. The Eighth Circuit declined to ex-
tend the ambit of U.S. labor laws to an American aircraft operating
outside the United States in Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses
Assn. v. Northwest Airlines.17 ' The court asserted that Congress
undoubtedly had the power to apply the Railway Labor Act to em-
ployees aboard such craft, but nothing in the Act suggested that
Congress had intended to do so.172 The court then stated its inten-
tion to adhere to "the rule that unless there is an explicit and une-
quivocal showing of a contrary intent, Acts of Congress are to be
given an interpretation which is domestic in nature," and then held
the Act to be inapplicable.'
166. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
167. 24 F.2d at 317.
168. 24 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1928).
169. Ia at 963.
170. Id.
171. 267 F.2d 170 (8th Cir. 1959).
172. Id. at 176.; cf United States v. Cordova, 89 F. Supp. 298 (E.D.N.Y. 1950), dis-
cussed infra note 209 and accompanying text.
173. 267 F.2d at 178.
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3. Territorial jurisdiction and the patent law
In contrast to the decisions reviewed above, there exists in pat-
ent case law some support for application of the territorial principle
of jurisdiction to United States ships and aircraft. Some courts, in
deciding matters of patent infringement, have adopted the proposi-
tion that the decks of United States flag ships are in essence an ex-
tension of American territory. Thus, the court in Gardiner v.
Howe174 extended the jurisdiction of United States patent law to
cover an infringing device on the deck of a United States flag vessel
on the high seas. According to the Gardiner court:
The patent laws of the United States afford no protection to in-
ventions beyond or outside of the United States; but this jurisdic-
tion extends to the decks of American vessels on the high seas, as
much as it does to all the territory of the country, and for many
purposes is even more exclusive.... Were it to be held that in
cases like the present the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, pat-
ents for improvements in the tackle and machinery of vessels, or
in their construction, would be valueless. 175
The converse of this principle appeared to be the basis for the
United States Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Duchesne. 176 In
Brown, a United States patent owner claimed that his patent had
been infringed by the use of a device aboard a French vessel docked
in an American port. The Brown court declined to extend the ambit
of the patent law's general language to the decks of the foreign ship.
This holding was based largely upon deference to the sovereignty
exercised by foreign governments over their flag vessels: the French
ship was, according to the court, in compliance with the patent laws
of the country to which it belonged, and this precluded application
174. 9 F. Cas. 1157 (C.C.D. Mass. 1865) (No. 5219).
175. Id
176. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1857). See also Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A.,
353 U.S. 138, 146 (1957) (citing to Brawn and holding that U.S. labor laws do not apply to
labor disputes aboard foreign vessels temporarily in U.S. ports); McCulloch v. Sociedad Na-
cional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963) (declining, absent clear sign from Con-
gress, to apply U.S. labor laws to ship of Honduran registry). But see Hellenic Lines Ltd. v.
Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970) (applying U.S. compensation law to foreign seaman on foreign
flag ship in United States waters).
Some courts and commentators have attempted to sort these jurisdiction decisions out
by categorizing them as involving United States flag ships, such as that in Gardiner, involving
wholly foreign-owned foreign flag ships temporarily in U.S. waters, such as that in Brown, or
involving "flag of convenience' ships registered in a foreign state but beneficially owned by
Americans, such as that in McCulloch. See Decca Limited v. United States, 191
U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 439, 441 (Ct. Cl. 1976), discussed infra note 194 and accompanying text;
Silverstein, supra note 146, at 144-45.
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of United States patent law to the presence or use of equipment on
board.
Following the lead of these decisions, the United States Court
of Claims later held in Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. v. United
States177 that the jurisdiction of American patent law extended to
the grounds of the American Legation in Peking. At issue were ten
receivers that had been manufactured and used at the United States
Naval Radio Station on the legation grounds, and that were claimed
to infringe the Marconi wireless telephone patents. 178 The court
cited both Gardiner and Brown for the principle that a nation's pat-
ent laws are, as a matter of territorial jurisdiction, properly applied
to vessels flying that nation's flag.179 The court found the situation
of the American Legation to be analogous, and, based upon this
theory of territoriality, found the patents to have been infringed.'
These decisions have led some commentators to assert that the
territorial principle suffices to extend American patent law to the
decks of American ships, and, by analogy, to activities aboard
American spacecraft."' Gardiner and the cases following it would
seem to indicate that United States patent law can be applied to
United States flag vessels for purposes of patent infringement.
However, as discussed above, activity outside the United States also
creates special problems in filing a U.S. patent application."8 2 It is
not entirely clear how the decisions following Gardiner might apply
to questions regarding the granting of patents, rather than the in-
fringement of patents. In the instances where the question has been
applied to inventions in outer space, the decisions are based upon
the Gardiner principle, but in an altered form.
Thus, in Rosen v. NASA, 83 the United States Patent Office
Board of Patent Interferences based its decision upon a theory of
territoriality closely paralleling that of Gardiner. The Appeals
Board was called upon to decide, inter alia, the date upon which a
device for orienting a satellite was first reduced to practice.'8 4 Re-
duction to practice required that all the elements of the invention be
operated in combination under conditions demonstrating that they
177. 53 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 246 (CL C1. 1942), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 320
U.s. 1 (1944).
178. Id at 255.
179. Id at 259.
180. Id.
181. See Saragovitz, supra note 153, at 88-94.
182. See supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
183. 152 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 757 (P.T.O. Bd. App. 1966).
184. Id at 766-68.
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"worked as intended to work in their practical contemplated
use."' 85 For the satellite system in question, this would first have
occurred through use in orbit.1 6 The question before the court was
whether or not this use occurred outside the United States for pur-
poses of reduction to practice.'" 7
In answering this question, the board relied heavily upon the
reasoning in Gardiner, Brown, and Marconi, quoting extensively
from the last decision.' The Board also cited an earlier interfer-
ence decision, Alford v. Loomis."8 9 The Alford decision concerned
the conception and reduction to practice of a transmitter system
that extended outside the political bounds of the United States. 190
Two of the Alford transmitters were within the United States. A
third "was on a United States craft and therefore effectively under
United States jurisdiction," much as was decided in Gardiner and
Marconi.' Consequently, the Alford decision held that:
We are inclined to view the operation of an integrated instrumen-
tality, a substantial portion of which is within the United States,
and which is operated by and for residents of the United States,
as not removed from the United States by reason of the projec-
tion of some elements of the instrumentality beyond the political
boundaries of the United States because of the space require-
ments of the instrumentality in its field of practical
application. 192
Based upon the reasoning of these prior decisions, the Board
found in Rosen that the satellite, when considered together with its
ground control, constituted an invention that may have extended
beyond the geographic boundaries of the United States, but was
nonetheless situated in the United States for purposes of reduction
to practice.19 3 The Appeals Board's reasoning in arriving at this de-
cision has been relied upon in subsequent cases presenting similar
facts.
In Decca Limited v. United States,94 infringement rather than
185. Id at 765 (quoting Bedford v. Boothroyal, 319 F.2d 200 (Ct. CI. 1963)); see also
Kempf, supra note 147, at 116-19 (discussing Rosen "integrated instrumentality" approach).
186. Rosen, 152 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) at 766.
187. Id.
188. Id at 767.
189. Id (citing P.T.O. Bd. App. Interference decision No. 84, 143, reversed on other




193. Id at 768.
194. 191 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 439 (Ct. C1. 1976).
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reduction to practice was once again the issue, but the case casts an
interesting illumination upon the earlier decision in Rosen. The al-
legedly infringing invention was the United States' Omega broad-
cast system, which appears to have been similar to the system
considered in Alford. Omega was a worldwide broadcast system
that allowed ships and aircraft to determine their location based
upon synchronized signals.195  Transmitter stations were located
both in the United States and in foreign nations, thus raising the
extraterritoriality issue.' 96 The trial court relied in part upon the
"floating island" theory to hold that the infringement occurred
within the United States. 197 The Court of Claims affirmed, but de-
clined to do so by relying upon the Gardiner principle of territorial
jurisdiction. 19 Rather, the appellate court relied upon the reasoning
in Rosen to hold that the system was an invention situated in the
United States but extending outside its political boundaries. 199
This reliance upon Rosen in the absence of Gardiner seems
somewhat odd, but Decca represents a turning point in explicit reli-
ance upon the "floating island" theory. More recent decisions from
the Court of Claims appear to have retreated from the territorial
rationale found in its previous holdings. For example, in the Decca
case, the court noted that the law has changed since Gardiner and
Marconi, by an amendment to the patent laws that added the terri-
torial language in 35 U.S.C. § 100 (q) discussed above." ° The court
then stated in dicta, "In view of the foregoing, we think a decision
founded on the fiction that for purposes of the Patent Laws, United
States ships and planes wherever found are United States territory,
would be founded on water." 201
Despite this pronouncement, it is difficult to see precisely how
the Decca decision differs from that in Gardiner. The fiction of a
"floating island" of United States territory is no different in concept
than the fiction of an "extended instrumentality" of United States
territory. In each case, the court relied upon the principle of terri-
torial jurisdiction, and found some juridical connection between the
195. Id.
196. Id. at 441.
197. The trial judge's opinion stated, "[flinally, and most importantly, when a United
States vessel uses the Omega System, that beneficial use occurs within the territorial limits of
the United States .. " (emphasis added). Decca Ltd. v. United States, 188 U.S.P.Q.(BNA)
167, 175 (CL Cl. 1975), aff'd, 191 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 439 (Ct. Cl. 1976). The appellate court
adopted the trial judge's opinion in toto except for this sentence. 191 U.S.P.Q. at 441.
198. 191 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) at 439.
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geographic United States and some situs outside the United States
for purposes of the patent laws. Moreover, to the extent that Decca
relies upon the reasoning in Rosen, it rests ultimately upon Gard-
iner, from which Rosen was derived.
Nonetheless, the Decca hostility toward the Gardiner holding
was real. The Court of Claims again disapproved of the Gardiner
rationale without overruling it in a subsequent case, Ocean Science
& Engineering v. United States.2" The court there suggested the
need for a clear signal from Congress regarding extraterritorial ap-
plication of the patent laws:
Of course, the constitutional power of Congress to make our pat-
ent laws applicable to processes carried out on U.S. flag ships and
planes at sea is not challenged; the question is whether Congress
has done so in view of the Supreme Court's view of strict con-
struction. Perhaps the patent bar will note the possible loophole
in the coverage of the U.S. patent laws and will invite the atten-
tion of Congress to it. Meanwhile, it is well to adjudicate cases
on other grounds when possible, as we do in this case.2 03
It would appear from the language of these more recent deci-
sions that courts may at least be reluctant to follow the Gardiner
rationale of territoriality, even though it has not been explicitly
overruled. Recent commentators have criticized any reliance on the
Gardiner holding, noting that the decision is only twenty-two lines
long and appears to stem from a public policy justification rather
than from thoughtful legal reasoning.204 Yet, as commentators who
are more sympathetic to Gardiner have pointed out, there should be
no reason for courts to experience this reluctance in the matter of
outer space inventions.205 As discussed above, the primary reason
for parsimony in extending the reach of United States law to Ameri-
can craft beyond the territory of the United States is respect for the
sovereignty of other nations.20 6 Yet, careful consideration of inter-
national treaties and the "free space" concept reveals that there can
be no such intrusion upon the sovereignty of other nations in outer
space. As Professor Donald Chisum stated during Congressional
hearings on this matter:
"It is true that the United States patent laws have no direct ex-
202. 595 F.2d 572 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
203. Id at 574.
204. See 1989 Hearing, supra note 2, at 50 (written statement of Professor Glen H.
Reynolds).
205. See infra note 207.
206. See, eg., Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S.(19 How.) 183 (1957), discussed supra note
175 and accompanying tet.
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traterritorial effect. A major reason for this limitation is the
avoidance of interference with the sovereignty of other countries,
which may have patent laws that differ from those of the United
States. However, having separate patent systems for each coun-
try in the world is a necessary evil at best since technology by its
very nature flows easily to wherever it may be effectively utilized.
Extending the scope of U.S. patents into space will not conflict
with the policies of any other sovereign. [Footnote and citation
omitted.]20 7
Thus, there should be no policy barrier to judicial extension of
United States patent law to spacecraft of United States registry.
Even those who have cautioned against reliance on Gardiner have
conceded that its approach reaches the correct outcome as a policy
matter.2"' The real problem with reliance upon Gardiner is that
private firms investing in outer space ventures cannot be certain
that courts will apply its rule. This uncertainty militates in favor of
congressional action to give the courts a clear signal regarding pat-
ents in outer space.
D. Precedent from the Criminal Law
The analysis above suggests that uncertainty in outer space
patent protection is inevitable without some clear sign from Con-
gress. Patent law is by no means unique in this regard. As is dis-
cussed in the sections below, United States criminal law has been
subject to similar concerns, prompting congressional action. The
history of criminal law in space suggests that such action is also
appropriate in the case of the patent laws.
1. Criminal law in outer space
Concerns over the application of United States law to activity
in outer space have already arisen in the area of criminal law, where
the extraterritorial question also arises. For example, the court in
United States v. Cordova2I was asked to determine whether an as-
sfiult committed aboard a United States flag aircraft flying above the
open sea fell within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the
United States criminal code. The criminal code as constituted at
that time extended to "vessels" on the "high seas." 210 The court
207. See 1985 Hearing, supra note 3, at 18-19 (statement of Professor Donald S.
Chisum).
208. See 1989 Hearing, supra note 2, at 57 (written statement of Professor Glen H.
Reynolds).
209. 89 F. Supp. 298 (E.D.N.Y. 1950).
210. Id. at 299 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 451).
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noted in dicta that Congress undoubtedly had the power to extend
the jurisdiction of the criminal laws to such activity aboard United
States registered aircraft, but nothing in the statute suggested that
Congress had in fact done so.2"1 The court therefore strictly con-
strued the statute, declining to include airplanes in the definition of
"vessels", and declining to include within the meaning of "on the
high seas" the airspace above the high seas.212
Decisions such as that in Cordova raised the same issues with
regard to criminal law in outer space that decisions such as that in
Decca raised with regard to the patent law. Congress initially ad-
dressed these criminal law concerns by mandating criminal liability
for violations of NASA regulations governing disorderly conduct
aboard United States spacecraft.213 These regulations relied heavily
upon the authority of mission commanders to mandate conduct
aboard their craft, and were sufficient to cover situations involving
small numbers of highly trained and disciplined astronauts.214
However, as the nation moved toward a time when larger numbers
of civilian men and women would live and work in space, it became
clear that this military-style regulatory scheme would not encom-
pass all the contingencies that might arise.215 Congress wrestled
with'this question in 1981, and concluded that confusion would be
avoided by adding United States spacecraft to the "special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction" of the United States criminal code.216
As a result, activities such as assault, rape, robbery, arson, or em-
bezzlement are clearly federal crimes if conducted aboard United
States spacecraft.217
2. Criminal and patent law parallels
The uncertainty surrounding extraterritorial application of
United States criminal law closely parallels that surrounding the
patent law, suggesting that similar congressional action is needed.
Criminal statutes, of course, are strictly construed, and the conclu-
sion reached by the court in Cordova has not necessarily been the
conclusion reached by courts interpreting other statutes. For exam-
211. Id. at 302.
212. Id at 303, 301-02.
213. 18 U.S.C. § 799 (1988).
214. 14 C.F.R. § 1214, 702 (1989).
215. See OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 73, at 43.
216. 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1988).
217. See OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 73, at 43; N. GOLDMAN, AMERICAN
SPACE LAW 135-36 (1988).
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ple, in D'Aleman v. Pan American World Airways,218 the Death on
the High Seas Act was held to provide a remedy for wrongful death
over the high seas, although the plain language of the statute cov-
ered tortious action "on" the high seas.2" It may well be that a
court deciding a question of patentability or patent infringement
where the activity took place on a United States spacecraft would
adopt a similar approach, and apply United States patent law to the
matter. However, in light of the language of Cunard and its prog-
eny, together with the invitation for congressional action in Ocean
Science, as well as precedent of the criminal law space legislation, it
would appear that some clear signal from Congress is needed.220
Thus, the progression in the application of United States crimi-
nal law to activities in outer space would seem to anticipate the
progression in the application of United States patent law to activi-
ties in outer space. Initially, NASA regulations were deemed suffi-
cient authority to deal with any criminal activity aboard United
States flag spacecraft, much as NASA's Joint Endeavor Agreements
have been sufficient to govern the distribution of intellectual prop-
erty rights aboard United States flag spacecraft. However, with the
governmental emphasis shifted toward commercialization of outer
space, and the prospect of increasing private sector activity in outer
space, administrative action by NASA no longer appears sufficient
to mediate every question of criminal or patent law that will arise.
In each area of law, ambiguities regarding extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion of American law make the common law approach an uncertain
proposition. In the criminal law, Congress responded with a clear
statement of legislative intent, and the same action would seem to
be called for in the case of patent law.
IV. LEGISLATION ON OUTER SPACE PATENTS
Because of the domestic and international law concerns ana-
lyzed above, federal legislation addressing the issue of patents in
outer space has been introduced on several occasions since 1985.
The language of this proposed legislation has changed markedly
since its initial introduction, and an understanding of these changes
is essential to any discussion of the form United States patent policy
will take in outer space. In particular, the legislative accommoda-
tions associated with the proposed multinational space station
218. 259 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1958); cf Airline Stewards and Stewardesses Ass'n, 267 F.2d
170 (8th Cir. 1959), discussed supra note 171 and accompanying text.
219. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1982).
220. See supra notes 160, 203 and accompanying text.
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should have a continued impact on the development of outer space
patent law. Some understanding of the proposed space station is
therefore necessary before undertaking a detailed examination of
the space patent legislation most recently before Congress. The
next section accordingly outlines the details of the space station
project.
A. The Multinational Space Station
As part of his increased emphasis on commercialization, of
outer space, President Reagan in 1984 instructed NASA to begin
building a permanently manned space station, and to invite other
countries to participate in this project.221 Japan, Canada, and nine
of the thirteen European Space Agency (ESA) nations have agreed
to participate.222 The proposed space station, which has been
named Freedom, will not be a single object, but is envisioned as a
loose assemblage of manned and unmanned components in low
earth orbit.223 Although the details of the space station design ap-
pear to shift almost weekly, certain features of the overall plan have
remained constant.224 The proposed structure of the space station
has important ramifications for United States outer space patent
policy.
1. The design of the multinational space station
As presently planned, a permanently occupied collection of
four interconnected modules will form the core of the space station
project.225 Different participating nations will provide different
components.226 International crews of four to eight persons would
occupy the station on three to six month rotations.227 Two of the
habitable core modules will be provided by the United States, one
will be provided by the ESA, and one will be provided by Japan.228
The Japanese module will have one section exposed to the environ-
221. See State of the Union, supra note 9.
222. UNITED STATES CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF:
SPACE STATIONS 3 (1989)[hereinafter CR ISSUE BRIEF].
223. Id. at 4; OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 73, at 3.
224. See, eg., Marshall, Space Science: Up in the Air, 246 SCIENCE 1110-111 (1989)
("The [space station plan] is a blur, changing almost every week, 'like a train roaring through
my office,' says ... a NASA science official .. ")
225. See CRS ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 222, at 4.
226. Id.; OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 73, at 3.
227. CRS ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 222, at 4; OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 73,
at 3.
228. CRS ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 222, at 4; OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 73,
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ment of outer space. 229 A lattice-work truss structure extending
from the modules will accommodate scientific instruments and elec-
tricity-producing solar panels.230 Canada will provide a robotic
Mobile Servicing System (MSS) used in assembly, maintenance, and
servicing of the space station.231 The MSS, together with a Flight
Telerobotic Servicer (FTS) developed by the United States, will also
be attached to the truss structure.232
In addition to the habitable "core" of the station, three or more
free-flying unmanned platforms would be associated with the space
station.233 These platforms would be used for experiments of other
purposes that would suffer from human presence - for example,
precise astronomic observations that would be disturbed by the vi-
bration of human movement. 234 Two platforms would be located in
the same orbit with the station core.235 One of these co-orbiting
platforms would be built by the United States, the other by the
ESA.236 At least one other platform would be placed in a higher,
polar orbit to facilitate earth observation.237 This platform would
be built by the United States.238 The assembly, servicing, and trans-
portation of the various station components would be largely pro-
vided by the American space shuttle.239 Because it incorporates
these flight components from several nations, the space station de-
sign presents serious concerns regarding legal jurisdiction.
2. Jurisdictional options for the space station
The potential for jurisdictional confusion in the space station
design outlined above is obvious. In 1986, the Congressional Office
of Technology Assessment (OTA) identified four different alterna-
tives that might be used in fixing jurisdiction aboard a multinational
space station.2' These possibilities were first, jurisdiction and con-
229. CRS ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 222, at 4-5.
230. Id. at 4.
231. Id. at 3-4; Marshall, supra note 224, at 1112.
232. CRS ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 222, at 5.
233. Id. at 4.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.; OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 73, at 3.
237. CRS ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 222, at 4; OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 73,
at 3.
238. CRS IsSUE BRIEF, supra note 222, at 4; OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 73,
at 3.
239. CRS ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 222, at 3; Marshall, supra note 224, at 1111-12.
240. See OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 73, at 30-32; Dalbello, Jurisdiction,
Intellectual Property, and Tort Law Aboard the Space Station, in AMERICAN ENTERPRISE,
supra note 5, at 41, 48 (additions supplementing reprint of OTA analysis).
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trol exercised by a single nation, presumably the United States; sec-
ond, joint jurisdiction and control exercised by all the participants;
third, national jurisdiction and control over independent modules;
and finally, uniform jurisdiction and control exercised by an inter-
national organization created for that purpose.241 Each of these op-
tions has its weaknesses and strengths.
For example, as the preeminent participant in the venture, the
United States could insist on placing the entire space station on the
United States space registry.242 This approach would avoid consid-
erable jurisdictional confusion and complexity. However, it is un-
likely that the other participants in the venture would agree to such
an approach, for a variety of political and practical reasons.243 One
commentator, considering the effect of this option on patent juris-
diction only, has observed that nationals from countries with a first
to file system might resent being subjected to priority disputes under
the American first to invent system.2' Similarly, uniform United
States jurisdiction would subject all nationals aboard the space sta-
tion to the Invention Secrecy Act, which provides that a foreign
patent application may not be filed for an invention "made in this
country" until six months after a United States patent application is
filed, unless a special license is obtained from the Commissioner of
Patents and Trademarks.245 Violation from this requirement invali-
dates any subsequent United States patent application.246 Thus,
under this jurisdictional option, foreign nationals might be penal-
ized for promptly filing patent applications in their own countries, a
consequence to which the other states participating in the space sta-
tion venture might object.2 47 Similar objections could likely be for-
mulated by the United States were the jurisdiction of another
participant applied to the project.
A similar difficulty is presented by the fourth option: even if a
multinational organization were formed to oversee the space sta-
tion, the problem would remain of deciding which body of substan-
241. OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 73, at 30-32.
242. Id. at 30; Dalbello, supra note 240, at 45-46.
243. See Oosterlinck, The Intergovernmental Space Station Agreement and Intellectual
Property Rights, 17 J. SPACE L. 23, 28 (1989).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 29; Letter from Donald S. Chisum, Professor of Law, University of Washing-
ton, to Representative Robert Kastenmeier, Chair, Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties
and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary (June 18, 1985)
reprinted in 1985 Hearing, supra note 3, at 422-23 (discussing effect of patent secrecy laws).
246. See Letter, supra note 245.
247. See Oosterlinck, supra note 243, at 29.
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tive law it would apply.24 8 The third option, that of independent
national jurisdiction over the various modules, would create a
patchwork jurisdictional scheme that would give rise to a bewilder-
ing array of legal issues. 249 One commentator has questioned the
status of common areas, such as hatches and passageways, under
this scheme. 250 Another commentator has questioned whether the
transfer of technology between modules would constitute importa-
tion and exportation under this option.2 ' United States inventors
could become subject to the patent priority problems discussed in
Part II, because of work done in other modules.252 However,, even
the third option would entail more certainty than attempting to de-
cide which state's laws would apply to a given situation under the
second option, that of joint jurisdiction.2"'
3. The Intergovernmental Agreement
These various jurisdictional considerations were resolved for
better or for worse on September 29, 1988, when the participating
nations signed the Agreement on Cooperation in the Detailed De-
sign, Development, Operation, and Utilization of the Permanently
Manned Civil Space Station (Intergovernmental Agreement or
IGA).254 The IGA adopts a dual approach to jurisdiction generally.
Article 5 of the IGA provides for each nation to exercise jurisdic-
tion over the components it registers and over its own nationals
wherever they are found.255 A recent commentator has labeled this
approach "probably unwise, '' 256 which seems a mild label for a
scheme that combines the worst aspects of the second and third
options discussed above. In addition to creating a patchwork of ju-
risdictions, the IGA creates the potential for confusing problems of
joint jurisdiction whenever a national of one country enters a mod-
ule under the registry of another.25 7
Where intellectual property is concerned, this situation is
somewhat mollified by provisions stating that the activity in or on
an element under the registry of a particular nation shall be consid-
ered to have occurred only in that nation's territory, thus effectively
248. See OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 73, qt 32.
249. See Dalbello, supra note 239, at 47-48.
250. See Meyer, supra note 119, at 343.
251. See Dalbello, supra note 239, at 47-48.
252. See supra notes 106-112 and accompanying text.
253. See OTA BACKGROUND, PAPER, supra note 73, at 31.
254. The provisions of the IGA are examined in detail in Note, supra note 147.
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eliminating the Ex Parte McKay nationality jurisdiction approach
for purposes of intellectual property law.2"8 In addition, the IGA
provides that the temporary presence of an item in transit through a
module shall not be considered a basis for a patent infringement suit
in the nation registering the module.2"9 The IGA does address, on
a nationality basis, the problem of patent restrictions for national
security mentioned above: the intellectual property rights of an in-
ventor who is not a national of the state having jurisdiction may not
be hindered by such secrecy laws.2"
Thus, although the overall approach of the IGA is largely un-
satisfactory, certain potential problems of patentability have been
foreseen and hopefully curtailed. However, under the patchwork
jurisdictional approach of the IGA, the uncertainty regarding
United States extraterritorial jurisdiction remains with regard to the
elements under United States registry. Clarifying legislation by
Congress is therefore still required. Several such bills have been in-
troduced in the 99th, 100th, and 101st Congresses, but as the next
section indicates, none of these initiatives has been successfully
enacted.
B. Measures Introduced
The need for clarification regarding patents in space has not
gone unnoticed; members of Congress have responded by introduc-
ing several versions of a bill designed to extend United States Patent
jurisdiction to spacecraft under United States jurisdiction or con-
trol. The evolution of the proposed legislation has important
ramifications for the scope of outer space patent law. The space
patent legislation originally introduced in the House of Representa-
tives entailed simply a declaration of extension of patent jurisdic-
tion, together with certain provisions on retroactivity.261
Subsequent revision of the legislation clarified several terms that
were ambiguous or potentially troublesome. More recently, an ex-
tensive revision of the proposed legislation has included exceptions
to the jurisdictional extension in order to accommodate the mul-
tinational space station IGA. A thorough discussion of the various
permutations of the proposed statutory language is central to the
258. Id at 756-57; cf Ex Parte McKay, 200 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 324 (P.T.O. Bd. App.
1975), discussed supra note 139 and accompanying text.
259. See Note, supra note 147, at 754; see also Oosterlinck, supra note 243, at 34-35
(suggesting that the "temporary presence" IGA provision parallels the temporary presence
doctrine applied in Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1957) and similar cases).
260. See Note, supra note 147, at 757.
261. See H.R. 2725, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., (1985).
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discussion here, but potentially confusing. This section therefore
sets out a comprehensive legislative history of the congressional ac-
tion on this matter to date.
1. The 99th Congress
Initiatives to enact legislation regarding patents in space have
been ongoing since 1985. During the 99th Congress, NASA pro-
posed space patent legislation that was included in the NASA au-
thorization bill H.R. 1714 considered by the House of
Representatives Committee on Science and Technology.262 The
House Committee on the Judiciary requested that this language be
deleted from the NASA authorization bill, because the legislation
fell within the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Subcommittee on
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice.263
The two full committees subsequently cooperated in the drafting
and referral of a free-standing bill, which was introduced by Repre-
sentative Kastenmeier, the chair of the Courts Subcommittee, on
June 11, 1985.264 The subcommittee held hearings on the bill, H.R.
2725, on June 13, 1985.265 The bill as introduced proposed to
amend both the patent laws and the National Aeronautics and
Space Act of 1958, and included provisions limiting the retroactiv-
ity of these amendments.266
262. See H.R. REP. No. 788, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 1 (1986).
263. -Id.
264. 131 CONG. Rac. H4104 (daily ed. June 11, 1985).
265. 131 CONG. REc. H680 (daily ed. June 13, 1985).
266. The retroactivity provisions read, in pertinent part:
SEC. 2. EFFECTIVE DATE
(a) In General - Subject to subsections (b) and (c) of this section, the
amendments made by section one shall apply to all United States patents
granted on, before, or after the date of enactment of this Act, and to all appli-
cations for United States patents pending on or filed on or after such date of
enactment.
(b) Amendments Not To Affect Prior Decisions - the amendments
made by section I shall not affect any final decision made by a court or the
Patent and Trademark Office before the date of the enactment of this Act with
respect to a patent or an application for a patent, if no appeal from such a
decision is pending and the time for filing an appeal has expired.
(c) Amendments Not To Affect Certain Pending Cases - The amend-
ments made by section 1 shall not affect the right of any party in any case
pending in a court on the date of the enactment of this Act to have the party's
rights determined on the basis of the substantive law in effect before such date
of enactment.
See, eg., H.R. 2725, supra note 261. Beginning with H.R. 4316, an additional subsection
was added, which read:
(d) Amendments To Be Prospective In Application - Subject to subsec-
tions (b) and (c) of this section, the amendments made by section 1 shall not
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An amended form of the bill, designated H.R. 4316, was intro-
duced by Representative Kastenmeier on March 5, 1986.267 The
bill was referred jointly to the House Committee on the Judiciary
and the House Committee on Science and Technology.268 On Au-
gust 5, this version of the bill was ordered by the Judiciary Commit-
tee to be reported to the full House of Representatives.2 69  The
Space Science and Applications Subcommittee held hearings on the
bill on August 12,270 and subsequently cleared a further amended
version of the bill to the full Science and Technology Committee.271
The Science and Technology Committee ordered the bill reported,
as amended, on September 11,272 and Part II of the report was filed
on September 16.273 The bill passed the House twice, first on Sep-
tember 16, 1986, as a free standing measure, and later as part of the
NASA authorization bill. 274 The legislation was received in the
Senate on September 18, 1986, and referred to the Senate Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, but no action was taken.275
2. The 100th Congress
Because the space patent legislation failed to pass both bodies
of Congress during the 99th Congress, a second attempt to enact the
needed legislation was initiated during the 100th Congress. Early in
the new legislative session, bills identical to the amended legislation
from the previous Congress were introduced.276 In the House, Rep-
resentative Kastenmeier reintroduced the legislation on March 10,
apply to any process, machine, article of manufacture, or composition of mat-
ter, and embodiment of which was launched prior to the effective date of this
Act.
See, eg., H.R. 4316, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). These provisions were added largely
because of ongoing litigation between the United States government and Hughes Aircraft
Company over satellite technology infringement. In defending itself against alleged patent
infringement, the government intended to argue that its satellites had been outside the patent
jurisdiction of the United States. See Letter from Robert A. McConnell, Assistant Attorney
General, United States Department of Justice to Neil A Hosenball, General Counsel, Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration (Oct. 11, 1984) reprinted in 1985 Hearing,
supra note 3, at 408-09.
267. 132 CONG. REC. H827 (daily ed. March 5, 1986).
268. Id.
269. 132 CONG. REc. D597 (daily ed.August 5, 1986); see H.R. REP. No. 51, 100th
Cong., 1st Seas., pt. I, at 3 (1987).
270. 132 CONG. REc. D1016 (daily ed. August 12, 1986).
271. 132 CONG. REc. D1068 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986).
272. 132 CONG. REc. H1091 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1986).
273. H.R. REP. No. 788, 99th Cong. 2d Sess., pt. 11 (1986).
274. See H.R. RaP. No. 51, supra note 269.
275. Id; H.R. 4316, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. (1986)(Act as received in the Senate)(copy on
file with the author).
276. H.R. Rr. No. 51, supra note 269.
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1987 as H.R. 1510.277 As in the previous year, the identical lan-
guage was included in a second bill, H.R. 1521, introduced by Rep-
resentative Roe on the same day.2 78 These bills were referred
jointly to the House Committee on the Judiciary and the House
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.27 9 In the Senate,
Senator Reigle introduced the measure as S. 501 on February 5,
1987.280
H.R. 1510 was marked up by the House Subcommittee on
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice on
March 26, and reported to the full committee on April 1, 1987.281
The House Judiciary Committee ordered the bill reported on April
8, and the report was filed on April 9.2 "2 The House Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology ordered H.R. 1510 reported on Oc-
tober 3, 1988, and the report was filed the same day.283 The mea-
sure passed the House of Representatives on October 5, 1988, and
was received in the Senate the next day.284 On October 6, 1988,
H.R. 1510 was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, where
S. 501 was still pending.285 Again, no action on the measure was
taken in the Senate before Congress adjourned.
3. The 101st Congress
In the 101st Congress, the space patent legislation was intro-
duced yet again. On the second day of the 1st Session, Congress-
man Roe reintroduced the legislation in the House of
Representatives as H.R. 352.286 The bill was again referred jointly
to the House Committees on the Judiciary and on Science, Space,
and Technology Committee.287 An amended version of the legisla-
tion was later introduced by Representative Kastenmeier on July
277. 133 CONG. REc. H1183 (daily ed. March 10, 1987).
278. Id
279. Id.
280. 133 CONG. Rnc. S1925-27 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1987).
281. 133 CONG. Rnc. D406 (daily ed. March 26, 1987); 133 CONG. REc. D445 (daily ed.
April 1, 1987); H.R. REP. No. 51, supra note 269.
282. 133 CONG. Rc. D459 (daily ed. April 8, 1987); H.R. REP. No. 51, supra note 269.
283. 134 CONG. REc. D1274 (daily ed. Oct 3, 1988); H.R. REP. No. 51, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 2, (1988).
284. The bill was in fact passed in its amended form through suspension of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, by an affirmative voice vote. 133 CONG. REc. H9969 (daily ed.
Oct. 5, 1987); H.R. 1510, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988)(Act as received in the Senate)(copy
on file with the author).
285. 134 CONG. RIc. D14924 (daily ed. Oct 6, 1988).
286. 135 CONG. RPc. H56 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1989).
287. Id.
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20, 1989.28 The latter version of the bill, H.R. 2946, was referred
jointly to the House Committee on the Judiciary and the House
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.2"9 H.R. 2946 was
the first version of the legislation to contain explicit language cover-
ing international agreements dictating the patent jurisdiction over
inventions in space. H.R. 2946 also was the first version of the pat-
ents in space legislation to amend only the patent laws, and not the
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. The House Subcom-
mittee on Space Science and Applications held public hearings on
the bill on September 21, 1989, and cleared the bill for considera-
tion by the full Science, Space, and Technology Committee.2 90 Sim-
ilarly, the Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property,
and the Administration of Justice held public hearings on October
4, 1989.291 At the time of this writing, the bill was still pending
before these respective House committees.
In the Senate, the measure was introduced on February 28,
1989, by Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee.292 The Senate bill, S.
459, was referred first to the Judiciary Committee, and subsequently
to that Committee's Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights, and
Trademarks.293 The Patent Subcommittee cleared an amended
form of the bill for consideration by the full committee on July 26,
1989. At the time of this writing, the amended bill was still pending
before the full Senate Judiciary Committee.294
C. Concerns and Compromises
As the even briefest perusal of the preceding section suggests,
the proposed legislation regarding patents in space has had a long
and convoluted history, involving multiple introductions, hearings,
and amendments. This degree of procedural intricacy is in some
senses surprising, because the space patent legislation enjoys wide-
spread support and is therefore in the political sense fairly non-con-
288. 135 CONG. REc. H4039 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1989). This corresponded to the amend-
ment in the nature of a substitute introduced in the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Pat-
ents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, discussed infra note 294 and accompanying text.
289. 135 CONG. REc., supra note 288.
290. 135 CONG. REc. D1044 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1989).
291. 135 CONG. REc. Dl127 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1989).
292. 135 CONG. REc. S1815-16 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1989). Senator Gore was a cosponsor
of the first space patent legislation introduced in the Senate, S. 501. See S. 501, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1987). Senator Reigle, who was the sponsor of S. 501, did not participate in spon-
soring S. 459. See S. 459, 101st Cong., 1st Sess (1989).
293. 135 CONG. REc., supra note 292.
294. 135 CONG. REc. D861 (daily ed. July 26., 1989).
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troversial. 295 Oddly, this dearth of political controversy may be in
some measure responsible for the delay in the legislation's enact-
ment; this proposed legislation has often sat dormant while more
visible issues received extensive attention. 296 However, the legisla-
tion's long rite of passage has had the positive effect of allowing it to
be carefully reviewed and refined. Many of these refinements have
been necessary to accommodate the proposed extension of United
States patent jurisdiction to activity aboard the proposed multina-
tional space station. The textual changes these accommodations
have required range from extensive additions to the alteration of
single words. Debates over the latter changes have, interestingly,
tended to be the most heated. The significance of these debates,
large and small, is explored in the following sections.
1. The term "aeronautical and space vehicle"
H.R. 2725 and the bills that followed it contained language ex-
tending United States patent jurisdiction to United States "aeronau-
tical and space vehicle[s] (as defined in section 203(2) of the
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (42 U.S.C. § 2452(2))
.... 297 The term "aeronautical and space vehicle" on its face
posed certain problems, by virtue of its conjunctive adjectives. The
United States space shuttle clearly fit the definition, having been
designed for use both in outer space and in the earth's atmos-
phere.298 However, the planned space station, having been designed
solely for deployment in outer space, appeared to fall outside a defi-
295. See, eg., 1985 Hearing, supra note 3, at 12-13 (statement of S. Neil Hosenball)("I
know of no opposition whatsoever."); 1986 Hearing, supra note 69, at 67 (witness' statements
that there is no known opposition to the proposed legislation); see also 1985 Hearing, supra
note 3, at 376-420 (correspondence received from governmental and private interests gener-
ally supportive of space patent legislation). But see Letter from Diane Davenny Darnielle,
Staff Vice President for Legislative Affairs, Schering-Plough Corporation, to Robert Kas-
tenmeier (June 11, 1985) reprinted in 1985 Hearing, supra note 3, at 390 (stating firm's posi-
tion that "[tihe proposed amendment is not essential since it merely codifies what has already
been accepted in U.S. courts .... (emphasis in original)); 1986 Hearing, supra note 69, at 48
(statement of Lester C. Krogh, Vice President for Research & Development, 3M Corpora-
tion)(legislation would merely "affirm" current state of the law); Mossinghoff, Intellectual
Property Rights in Space Ventures, 10 J. SPACE L. 107, 110 (1985) (outer space patent issue
"would probably be better handled through the case law; i.e., the common law approach to
developing precedent").
296. For example, during the first session of the 101st Congress, the space patent legisla-
tion sat unconsidered by the Senate Judiciary Committee while the Committee debated more
pressing matters, such as lawless flag burning, or the reinstatement of Colonel Oliver North's
military pension.
297. See, eg., H.R. 2725, supra note 261.
298. See Reynolds, Book Review, 27 JuRIMETRics J. 431, 435 n.9 (1987) (reviewing
OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 73).
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nition that included the term "aeronautical." Accordingly, one
commentator discussing H.R. 1510 noted that the use of this term
might preclude the space station from the scope of the legislation.2 99
The statutory definition referenced by the bill stated that "the term
'aeronautical and space vehicles' means aircraft, missiles, satellites,
and other space vehicles, manned and unmanned, together with re-
lated equipment, devices, components, and parts."" °  This defini-
tion did not appear to fit the space station either, especially because
it defined "vehicle" in terms of itself.301 The connotations of the
term "vehicle" appeared problematic because of its association with
spacecraft with a particular transportation function.30 2 The assem-
blage of manned and unmanned components envisioned for the
space station might fall outside a conventional interpretation of this
term.
The problem was solved in H.R. 2946 and the most recent
amendment to S. 459 by substitution of the term "space object" for
"aeronautical and space vehicle." This term is used in the Registra-
tion Convention,30 3 and the report drafted to accompany S. 459 in-
dicates that the term is intended to be interpreted as defined in that
treaty. In addition, "space object" is a term that should easily
encompass almost any human artifact launched into outer space,
including the various modules of the space station.
Unfortunately, however, this term is itself the subject of some
ambiguity, having never been precisely defined in international
space law.30 5 The definition given in the Registration and Liability
299. Id.
300. 42 U.S.C. § 2452 (2) (1982). Strangely enough, another definition of "vehicle" had
been added in 1981 to section 305 of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Act
of 1958, but the proposed legislation did not make any reference to this more useful defini-
tion: "(k) Any object intended for launch, launched or assembled in outer space shall be
considered a vehicle for the purpose of section 272 of title 35 United States Code." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2457(k) (1982); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2458b (f)(1) (for purposes of insurance and indemnifica-
tion, "the term 'space vehicle' means an object intended for launch, launched or assembled in
outer space, including the Space Shuttle and other components of a space transportation
system, together with related equipment, devices, components and parts.")
301. 42 U.S.C. § 2452(2).
302. Cf United States v. Cordova, 89 F. Supp. 298, 301-02 (E.D.N.Y. 1950) ("vessel ...
evokes in the common mind the picture of a ship, not a plane .. "), discussed supra note 209
and accompanying text.
303. See Registration Convention, supra note 123, at art. I, II and V.
304. See Draft Report, supra note 2, at 13.
305. For example, some commentators have noted that it is not entirely clear whether
the space shuttle is always a "space object." During re-entry, the shuttle acts very much like
an aircraft, and the classification it might receive has a large effect on liability. Liability for a
"space object" under the Liability Convention is absolute, whereas other rules apply for an
"aircraft." See Tompkins & Margo, Space Law - Fact or Myth? in SPACE: LEGAL AND
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conventions is if anything, more circular than the United States
statutory definition of "vehicle" discussed above. The international
treaties define "space object" as "includ[ing] component parts of a
space object as well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof, ' 30 6 a
definition that one commentator has aptly termed "rather use-
less."'3 7 Although the space station appears clearly to be a "space
object," the scope of the term is not unlimited.308 Jurisdiction and
control under Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty encompasses
only "objects launched into outer space.1 30 9 Thus, because it em-
ploys the term space object, the proposed legislation might not ex-
tend to a moon or Mars facility constructed wholly or partly of
extraterrestrial materials.310 In fact, the applicability of the pro-
posed legislation to any facility situated on a celestial body is un-
clear. NASA representatives strongly denied the applicability of
early drafts of the legislation to facilities on celestial bodies.3 '
NASA has indicated that concern over patent jurisdiction on celes-
tial bodies is in their opinion premature, yet this exclusion seems
odd in light of the present administration's call for a permanent
moon base to be constructed in the foreseeable future.312
2. The term "made, used, or sold"
The language of H.R. 2725 applied only to "inventions made
or used" in outer space.313 However, unauthorized sale of a pat-
ented invention is also an act of infringement, and such sales could
conceivably occur in outer space.314 This oversight was corrected in
H.R. 4316 and subsequent versions of the legislation by changing
the bill to read "made, used, or sold." In addition, the term
COMMERCIAL IssuEs, supra note 28, at 2, 14-15. Note also that the European experiment
module Spacelab, which was carried aloft by the space shuttle, was never registered because
of NASA's contention that it did not constitute a separate "space object." See Letter from
Ian Pryke, European Space Agency, to Representative Bill Nelson, Chairman, Subcommittee
on Space Science and Applications of the House Committee on Science and Technology (Sep-
tember 15, 1986) reprinted in 1986 Hearing, supra note 69, at 93.
306. Registration Convention, supra note 123, at art. I.
307. See Meredith, Status of the "Patents in Space" Legislation in Congress, 17 J. SPACE
L. 163, 166 (1989).
308. Id.; see also Note, supra note 147, at 749.
309. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 120, at art. VIII.
310. Meredith, supra note 307, at 166; 1989 Hearing, supra note 2, at 3 (written state-
ment of Professor Glen H. Reynolds).
311. See 1985 Hearing, supra note 3, at 11 (statement of S. Neil Hosenball) ("This cur-
rent legislation does not extend itself to the Moon.")
312. Set Meredith, supra note 307, at 166.
313. See H.R. 2725, supra note 261.
314. See 1985 Hearing, supra note 3, at 19, 21 (statement of Professor Donald S.
Chisum).
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"made" presented some ambiguity by itself. On its face, the pro-
posed legislation was not immediately clear as to the scope of this
term. One possible reading of "made" could refer to manufacture
of items aboard U.S. spacecraft, thus going to the question of in-
fringement. A second interpretation of "made" might refer to in-
vention, thus going to the question of conception and reduction to
practice. The former reading seemed a likely interpretation, be-
cause infringement is defined under the patent laws in terms of
making, using, or selling.315 However, as discussed more fully
above, under the American patent system both readings are impor-
tant to discoveries in space.316 Some concern was expressed that
under the United States' "first to invent" system, investment in
outer space might be curtailed were acts of invention not explicitly
included in the statute's language.317
Consequently, it was suggested that the term "invented" be ad-
ded to the text of S. 459.318 Another practical and quite elegant
solution to the problem of defining "made, used or sold" was also
available: the term should not be used at all. Rather, the proposed
legislation should simply be altered to include any activity aboard
United States flag spacecraft for purposes of the patent law.319
Neither of these suggestions was adopted. However, the legislative
history drafted to accompany the most recent version of the space
patent bill states that "'made', 'used', and 'sold' are intended to
have the same meaning' as they have elsewhere in the patent law,
and in the case of "made," this includes both acts of invention and
manufacture of an invention.320
3. The question of international organizations
H.R. 2946 and S. 459, as amended, contained certain provi-
sions applicable to space objects "carried on the registry of a foreign
state. ' 32 1 As might be expected, these provisions are particularly
important in the context of a multinational space station. Unfortu-
nately, it is not immediately apparent on the face of the proposed
legislation what might constitute a "foreign state." The ESA ex-
315. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a) (1982).
316. See supra notes 105-18 and and accompanying text.
317. See Letter from Clayton F. Callis, President, American Chemical Society, to Sena-
tor Joseph Biden, Chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary (September 21, 1989) re-
printed in 1989 Hearing, supra note 2, at 87.
318. Id.
319. See 1985 Hearing, supra note 3, at 21 (statement of Professor Donald S. Chisum).
320. See Report, supra note 2, at 8.
321. H.R. 2946, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 459, supra note 292.
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pressed concern over this problem, because it is an organization
comprised of several different states, and could conceivably be ex-
cluded from a U.S. court's interpretation of the term.322
This difficulty in classifying international inter-governmental
organizations is not a new one, and is to some extent embedded in
the text of the international treaties governing the use and explora-
tion of outer space. During the drafting of the Outer Space Treaty,
there was considerable resistance by the Soviet delegation to the in-
clusion of treaty provisions recognizing international inter-govern-
mental organizations.3 23 After considerable debate, a sentence was
added to Article VI of the treaty, making both an international or-
ganization and the treaty States participating in the organization
responsible for the organization's outer space activities.324 Lan-
guage discussing international inter-governmental organizations
was also included in Article XIII, specifying that the provisions of
the Outer Space Treaty apply to signatory states operating as part
of such an organization. 325 Article XIII states that practical ques-
tions arising under the treaty involving an international organiza-
tion may be resolved by dealing either with the organization or with
the organization's treaty State members.326
Thus, although the foundational Outer Space Treaty mentions
international organizations, they remain "second-class citizens"
without a clear subject status of their own.327 Indeed, only states,
and not international organizations can ratify, amend, or withdraw
from the treaty.3 21 Much the same situation exists under the Regis-
tration Convention. Article VII of the Registration Convention
makes clear that "states" under the Convention includes interna-
tional intergovernmental organizations, provided that the organiza-
tion formally adheres to the Convention and the majority of the
organization's member states are parties to both the Registration
Convention and the Outer Space Treaty. 329 However, such organi-
zations still are not eligible to ratify, amend, seek review of, or with-
322. See Letter from Professor Reimar List, Director General, European Space Agency,
to Representative Robert Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual
Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary (Sep-
tember 21, 1989) reprinted in 1989 Hearing, supra note 2, at 83.
323. See Dembling & Arons, The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty, 33 J. AIR L. &
COMM. 402, 437-38 (1967).
324. Id.
325. Id. at 451-53.
326. Id ; Outer Space Treaty, supra note 120, at art. XIII.
327. N. GOLDMAN, supra note 217, at 75-76.
328. Id. at 75.
329. Id at 84.
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draw from the Registration Convention.33 °
Consequently, the "foreign state" status of international orga-
nizations such as the ESA is open to some question. The ESA is
clearly a state for purposes of registering space objects under the
Registration Convention, and it maintains such a registry. How-
ever, the definition of "state" for purposes of the proposed space
patent legislation need not necessarily be the same as that under the
registration Convention, and the ESA is clearly not a "state" for
purposes of ratifying or amending the relevant international space
treaties. This problem is addressed in the legislative history to ac-
company S. 459, which states that a "foreign state" under the pro-
posed legislation is intended to include organizations that comply
with Article VII of the Registration Convention.331
4. Placement of the legislation
The proposed space patent legislation has from its inception
contemplated the creation of a new section 105 in the United States
patent code. 32 Intellectual property and space law experts testify-
ing before the House Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Prop-
erty, and the Administration of Justice recommended that the
amendments instead be incorporated into 35 U.S.C. § 100 (c).333
As discussed above, this section of the patent statutes contains defi-
nitions of the "United States" and of "in this country" for purposes
of the patent law;3 34 because the proposed legislation in a sense
adopts a particular definition of activity within the United States, it
was suggested that these related matters be kept together.335 Such
placement of the amendments offered the additional benefit of legis-
lative clarity. One possible problem with placement of the amend-
ments following section 104 of the patent code might be an
unintended inference that Congress intended the new legislation to
affect only the definition of activity within the United States with
regard to priority and to patentability. Infringement, which is dealt
with in a subsequent section, might by implication be argued not to
have been included within the intended scope of the legislation.336
330. Id.
331. See Report, supra note 2, at 7.
332. See, e.g., H.R. 2725, supra note 261.
333. See 1985 Hearing, supra note 3, at 19 (statement of Professor Donald S. Chisum);
1989 Hearing, supra note 2, at 46-47 (written statement of Professor Glen H. Reynolds).
334. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
335. See 1985 Hearing, supra note 3, at 19 (statement of Professor Donald S. Chisum).
336. Id. at 21.
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Such a problem could be avoided by the legislative placement
suggested.
Representatives from NASA evidenced strong reservations
about such placement of the proposed legislation because of possible
"unintended ripple effects." '337 In general, NASA appeared not to
share the perception that the legislation was equivalent to an
amendment of the 35 U.S.C. § 100(e) definition. According to
NASA, the legislation, as originally conceived, relied upon princi-
ples of registration drawn from international space treaties to assert
United States patent jurisdiction over United States spacecraft.338
NASA feared that placement of the proposed registration within 35
U.S.C. § 100 (c) would signal an intent to make U.S. spacecraft "a
piece of the United States. ' 339 This might create problems in mul-
tinational agreements, such as that involving the space station,
where the United States might wish to waive or negotiate intellec-
tual property jurisdiction.3" At the very least, NASA feared that
such placement of the legislation might appear to some nations as
an attempt to extend United States territorial jurisdiction, and cre-
ate resistance in multinational negotiations.341
As a consequence, space patent bills introduced to date have
continued to contemplate creation of a new section 105, and the
suggestion that the legislation be targeted for section 100 has not
been adopted. This approach, together with the refinements dis-
cussed below, clearly signals the reliance upon international registry
as a basis of jurisdiction, rather than acknowledgement of the Gar-
diner territorial rationale. The problem of an unintended inference
regarding infringement has been solved by language in the draft of
the accompanying report that indicates that infringement of U.S.
patents on spacecraft under U.S. jurisdiction or control is intended
to fall within the statute's ambit.342
5. The problem of "jurisdiction or control"
As discussed in Part II above, Article VII of the Outer Space
Treaty provides that a State retains "jurisdiction and control" over
objects launched into outer space, as well as over the personnel
aboard, if the object is carried on the registry of that State.343 This
337. Id. at 20 (statement of Robert F. Kempf, Assistant General Counsel for Patents).
338. Id. at 6 (statement of S. Neil Hosenball).
339. Id. at 20 (statement of Robert F. Kempf).
340. Id.
341. See id.
342. See Report, supra note 2, at 6-7.
343. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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provision is implemented by the Registration Convention. 3" Under
Article II of the Convention, States are expected to register the ob-
jects that they launch into outer space, and, if there is more than
one launching State, the States agree between them as to which
state will be the State of registry.345 The Convention also provides
that States may agree for a launching State other than the State of
registry to have jurisdiction and control over the object.346 States
may also agree that different components of a space object are to be
registered by different launching States.347 Under any of these per-
mutations, the registry of an object makes clear which State holds
jurisdiction and control.
The international community was somewhat disconcerted
then, when the language of H.R. 2725 proposed to extend the pat-
ent law of the United States to spacecraft under the jurisdiction or
control of the United States.348 Indeed, every version of the space
patent legislation introduced to date has retained this language.
The change of the single word, from conjunctive to disjunctive, is
significant because it could foment conflict with the clear rule of the
Outer Space Treaty. Under this language, jurisdiction and control
appear to be separate elements, divorced from the imprimatur of
registry. The class of space objects under either United States juris-
diction or United States control is potentially much broader than
the class of space objects under both United States jurisdiction and
United States control. American courts could find under this lan-
guage that United States patent law applies to any space object fall-
ing into the former class.349 The relevant international treaties, on
the other hand, indicate that jurisdiction and control are a package
that comes with registry.
The United States' partners in the multinational space station
venture had particular cause to be concerned by the language be-
cause of the United States' dominance in the project. Several situa-
tions can be envisioned where the United States might exercise
factual control over a space object under foreign registry. For ex-
ample, one congressional witness suggested that such a scenario
might arise if communications or ground control services were pro-
344. See Registration Convention, supra note 123.
345. Id. at art. II.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. See H.R. 2725, supra note 261.
349. See 1986 Hearing, supra note 69, at 60 (statement of Dennis Burnett, Esq., repre-
senting Messerschmitt-B6lkow-Blohm, GmbH).
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vided to a foreign space object by U.S. facilities.350 Indeed, this is
very similar to the situation in the Decca or Rosen cases discussed
above.351 Similarly, ownership or management by United States
corporations might constitute "control" over a space object on a
foreign registry.3" 2 Situations such as these are very likely to arise
in the context of the space station, creating a very real prospect that
U.S. intellectual property law might be applied to space objects on
the registry of its international partners.
Amendments to the bill were suggested, replacing "jurisdiction
or control" with language reading "registered on the registry of the
United States" as provided for in the Registration Convention, or in
other words, under the jurisdiction and control of the United
States.35 3 The precedent cited for this change was found in the outer
space criminal law amendments discussed above. 5 4 Under the
criminal code, United States jurisdiction was indeed made explicitly
dependent upon registry under the international space treaties.3 5
Despite this, NASA expressed reluctance to implement this change
of language.35 6 In testimony before Congress, representatives from
NASA stressed the agency's position that the "registration . . .
should be taken as prima facie evidence of jurisdiction and control"
for purposes of the patent law.35 7 This language in fact found its
way into the committee reports accompanying H.R. 1510 and H.R.
4316.358 Prima facie evidence, however, creates only a rebuttable
presumption, indicting NASA felt some situations might arise
where U.S. patent law should be applied despite the space object's
registry.
359
The report language concerning prima facie evidence has not,
however, been incorporated into the most recent legislative history
to accompany the space patent registration. Rather, both the report
350. Id.
351. See supra notes 183-99 and accompanying text.
352. See 1986 Hearing, supra note 69, at 60 (statement of Dennis Burnett, Esq.).
353. See Letter from Dennis Burnett, Esq., to representative Bill Nelson, Chair, Subcom-
mittee on Space Science and Applications of the House Committee on Science and Technol-
ogy (September 4, 1984) reprinted in 1986 Hearing, supra note 69, at 87.
354. Id.
355. 18 U.S.C. § 7(6) (1989).
356. See 1986 Hearing, supra note 69, at 66 (statement of Robert F. Kempf) (suggested
change might be "too restrictive").
357. 1986 Hearing, supra note 69, at 22 (statement of S. Neil Hosenball); 1985 Hearing,
supra note 3, at 6 (statement of S. Neil Hosenball).
358. See H.R. Rep. No. 788, supra note 262, at 8; H.R. REP. No. 51, supra note 269, at
9.
359. See 1986 Hearing, supra note 69, at 69 (statement of Michael Kirk)(changing lan-
guage of proposed legislation to "registry" might have unintended non-space effects).
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and the latest version of the proposed legislation incorporate dis-
crete exceptions to instances of United States jurisdiction or con-
trol."ec These exceptions are designed to accommodate the
international concerns outlined above, and are considered vital in
the implementation of the space station IGA. The first exception in
fact has been a part of the legislation since the introduction of H.R.
4316.61 This exception provides that components under the juris-
diction or control of the United States will be exempted from the
scope of the proposed legislation if specifically identified and other-
wise provided for in an international agreement. For example, the
IGA provides that laws requiring national security review of patent
applications may not be applied to hinder foreign patent application
of foreign nationals aboard the space station component of a given
nation.362 This first exception in the proposed legislation is neces-
sary to allow the United States to implement this waiver provision
of the IGA.
The second exception, which first appeared in H.R. 2946 and
S. 459 as amended, states that activity aboard a space object regis-
tered by a foreign entity will not be considered to have occurred in
the United States for purposes of the patent law, regardless of
United States jurisdiction or control.363 The committee report indi-
cates that this exception was provided to squarely meet any con-
cerns over the use of "jurisdiction or control" as opposed to
"jurisdiction and control. ' '" 3 4 Of course, the former phrase remains
part of the proposed legislation; it may be modified by the excep-
tion, but has not become jurisdiction and control. The one word
change from "or" to "and" would have been far simpler than the
addition and explanation of the new exception if the drafters of the
bill had intended the bill's phrase "jurisdiction or control" to be
coterminous with the Outer Space Treaty's "jurisdiction and con-
trol." It would appear that something beyond the registration pro-
vision found in the international treaties is intended. Consequently,
under the proposed legislation, courts might legitimately apply
United States patent law to activities in outer space where either
United States jurisdiction or control are present, and where the sov-
ereignty of another nation as evidenced by registration would not be
offended. It is difficult to imagine the facts under which such a situ-
ation might someday arise. Still, the reservation of this broader
360. See Report, supra note 2, at 6-7; S. 459, supra note 292; H.R. 2946, supra note 321.
361. See H.R. 4316, supra notes 266, 275.
362. See supra notes 305-12 and accompanying text.
363. See S. 459, supra note 292; H.R. 2946, supra note 321.
364. See Report, supra note 2, at 7.
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range of patent jurisdiction is consistent with NASA's earlier state-
ments regarding prima facie evidence, and seems evident in the
more recent legislation from both the breadth language retained and
the narrowness of the exception added.
D. Beyond Space Patents
The analysis above indicates certain areas where the proposed
legislation on space patents may be less than adequate, as for exam-
ple, in the case of permanent bases on celestial bodies.3 6 Congress
may eventually be required to revisit the subject of outer space pat-
enting to correct such shortcomings. In addition, it should be noted
that patents are by no means the only type of intellectual property
important to commercial activity in outer space. Other areas of in-
tellectual property, such as trade secret and copyright, will un-
doubtedly require the same sort of clarification as that discussed
regarding patent law. The sections below indicate some concerns
that may arise in these areas.
1. Trade secrets
In order for a discovery to be patentable, it must, as discussed
above, undergo an administrative review process to ensure the dis-
covery's novelty, utility, and non-obviousness. 66 Many industrial
processes fail to meet the stringent requirements for patentability.
These discoveries are nonetheless valuable, and are often protected
under the law of trade secrets. Trade secret law is derived from
state tort law concepts of conversion, misappropriation, and breach
of a confidential or contractual relationship. 67 Once the trade se-
cret is revealed, protection is lost.3 68 The space station is eventually
expected to become the focus of outer space manufacturing, and to
the extent that non-patentable industrial processes are used in outer
space, the availability of trade secret law may become a more press-
ing concern than the availability of patent law.
The proposed space patent legislation does not address the
matter of trade secrets, and it would appear that no federal legisla-
tion is presently being contemplated to do so. Professor Reynolds,
discussing this problem in the context of the OTA background pa-
per mentioned above, has suggested two possible solutions.3 69 First,
365. See supra notes 305-12 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
367. See RESTATEMENT op TORrs § 757 (1959).
368. 1 R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 5.03 (1983).
369. See Reynolds, supra note 298, at 440.
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Congress might federalize the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, ex-
tending it to activity in outer space.370 As an alternative, Congress
might designate the law of a particular state to govern such activ-
ity.3 71 Such unilateral action, however, would govern only trade
secrets on space objects of United States registry. The difficult
problem of protecting non-patentable proprietary matter in the
multi-national space station would remain. The problem becomes
particularly complex when one considers the difficulty inherent in
maintaining secrecy in the cramped quarters of the station, as well
as the probability that "manufacturing processes might be carried
out in more than one module, ' 372 where the modules may be under
the registries of different nations.
Very few solutions seem tenable in the face of such complexity.
One possibility might be a "free-market" approach employing ex-
tensive cross-licensing. It would behoove any corporation expecting
to implement proprietary, non-patentable manufacturing processes
in outer space to approach the other participants in the venture, and
solicit from them agreements not to pirate one another's trade
secrets. Enforcement of such an agreement might pose problems,
but no more so than any other international manufacturing agree-
ment. Adherence to such an agreement would in theory benefit all
the participants, because once a participant defected from the agree-
ment, no one's secrets would be safe. Defectors might also expect
to find the participants in future space ventures reluctant to deal
with a known defector, thus effectively cutting a defector off from
outer space participation. Defection might only present a serious
problem, then, in instances where the value of practicing a misap-
propriated trade secret on earth exceeded the value of future outer
space activity. Sufficient enforceable sanctions would have to be
built into the agreement to preclude such a conclusion in partici-
pants' calculus of cooperation.373
370. Id.; see also generally UNIFoRM TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 373 (supp. 1989).
371. Reynolds, supra note 298, at 463. The fascinating question of whether trade secret
law, as a matter of state law, might already apply to outer space activity remains unresolved.
The OTA report on space stations noted that the division of jurisdiction between state and
federal government is largely unaddressed, but that the permissive "long arm" statute of a
state such as Texas might extend to space activity. See OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra
note 73, at 29, 74 ("Arguably, under Texas law, merely controlling the space station from the
Johnson Space Center exposes all participants to Texas jurisdiction.") Federal legislation in
this area may be called for simply to "occupy the field" and preempt the many state trade
secret laws.
372. Reynolds, supra note 298, at 440.
373. In fact, there would appear to be pressure from the outset for such an agreement to
fall apart, because the benefits of cooperation are shared, whereas the benefits of defection are
unilateral. Much as in the classic Prisoner's Dilemma, the optimal situation for any given
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The drawback to this private contractual approach is, of
course, the transactional costs associated with seeking out and ne-
gotiating agreements with every participant in the space station ven-
ture. These costs might well dampen firms' enthusiasm for entry
into the project. It would be far preferable to have an overall trade
secret scheme in place, applying to all the various modules of the
space station. Presumably, such a scheme could be incorporated
into the Intergovernmental Agreement governing the space station.
Although this solution is by far the most preferable, the likelihood
of its implementation must be assessed in light of the IGA's current
jurisdictional patchwork regarding the patent law; if no agreement
could be reached on uniform jurisdiction in any other area of law,
agreement is unlikely to be reached on trade secret law. However, a
uniform scheme remains a goal that should be worked toward, and
at the very least, Congress should resolve the trade secret question
with regard to United States space objects."
2. Copyright in outer space
Another area of intellectual property that may require clarifi-
cation with regard to its application in outer space is copyright law.
This subject has received some treatment by commentators discuss-
ing the interception of proprietary satellite transmissions, as well as
by those discussing remote sensing data.375 It has, however, re-
ceived very little attention in the context paralleling that of the pat-
ent law discussion above, that is, where the fixation of a
copyrightable work occurs while the author is living and working in
outer space.376 This neglect may stem in part from the fact that
copyright protects original works of authorship such as literary
works, musical works, audiovisual works, or pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works. These copyrightable works are not as necessary
firm would be to enjoy the beneft of the agreement while also being able to exploit the other
participant's secrets; see generally M. DAVIS, GAME THEORY: A NoNTEcHNICAL INTRO-
DUCTION (1983). Paradoxically, the lack of secrecy that engenders the original problem
might also operate to hold the cooperation agreement together. As long as the number of
participants in the space venture were small, it would be almost impossible for a firm to defect
without dicovery and imposition of sanctions by the other participants.
374. Reynolds, supra note 298, at 440.
375. See, eg., N. GOLDMAN, supra note 217, at 104-05; B. Luxenberg, Protecting Intel-
lectual Property in Space" Policy Options and Implications for the United States, Address to the
Georgia Institute of Technology 1985 Conference on International Space Policy (May 16, 1985)
reprinted in 1985 Hearing, supra note 3, at 260, 264-71.
376. Copyright in this context is mentioned by Beier & Stauder, Space Stations and Intel-
lectual Property Law, United States Patent and Trademark Office translation of Weltraumsta-
tionen und das Recht des geistigen Eigentums, 1 GRUR INTERNATIONAL 6 (1985) reprinted
in 1985 Hearing, supra note 3, at 67.
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to the growth outer space industry as are patentable inventions, nor
do these copyrightable works generally require the same capital in-
vestment. Thus, the impetus for prompt consideration of this type
of intellectual property may be lacking. However, it seems safe to
assume that before human beings have occupied an extraterrestrial
environment for very long, they will begin to generate works that
are properly the subject of copyright, and disputes over ownership
and control will arise. In addition, certain types of copyrightable
subject matter, such as computer software, may have a significant
commercial value vis a vis space industry. 77
The law of copyright as applied in outer space therefore de-
serves some consideration. Although an extended examination of
the topic goes beyond the scope of this article, the copyright ques-
tion provides an interesting contrast to the patent problems dealt
with here. The United States patent laws, as discussed above, tend
to follow principles of territorial jurisdiction. Unlike the patent
laws, the recently revised copyright act incorporates many princi-
ples of national jurisdiction. For example, section 104 of the copy-
right act provides that unpublished works are subject to U.S.
copyright protection without regard to the nationality of the author,
whereas published works are protected only if certain nationality
criteria are met.3 78  These criteria require that the work be pro-
duced by a U.S. national, a foreign national from a country with
which the United States has signed a copyright treaty, or a "state-
less person. 3 79 Similarly, section 101 provides that an unpublished
work is a "Berne work" for purposes of the copyright laws if one or
more of the authors of the work is a national of a Berne treaty
state.3 8 Section 101 also provides that the United States is consid-
ered the country of origin of a work if all the authors are nationals
of the United States.38
However, the copyright act also partakes of some aspects of
territoriality. Thus, under section 101, the United States is consid-
ered the country of origin of a work if it is published "in the United
377. Note also that in the United States, the design features of semiconductor chips,
called mask works, are protected under a "copyright-like" statute, the Semiconductror Chip
Protection Act, that may share some of these considerations. See 17 U.S.C. § 901 et. seq.
(1989). As suggested in Part I above, semiconductor manufacture is a likely candidate for a
space venture, and one might question whether there might be circumstances under which
certain designs used or conceived in outer space will not be considered first exploited "in the
United States." See id. § 902.
378. 17 U.S.C. § 104.
379. Id. § 104 (1), (2).
380. Id. § 101.
381. Id.
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States. 382 Similarly, in order for a published work to qualify as a
Berne work under section 101, the work must be published in a
Berne treaty nation.38 3 These distinctions are important because
the United States copyright laws impose different requirements
upon works whose country of origin is the United States. These
requirements are especially important in enforcing a copyright. For
example, under section 411, registration is required for works
whose country of origin is the United States.31 Even though a
valid copyright may be had for such works, no infringement action
may be brought for them unless a registration application has been
filed.385 Similarly, under section 407, there is a deposit requirement
for works published "in the United States. ' 3 8 6
Given this mixture of national and territorial jurisdictional
principles, one can easily see why some congressional directive on
extraterrestrial application of U.S. copyright laws would be desira-
ble. Particularly where a multinational space station is concerned, a
variety of bewildering nationality and registration mixtures can be
quickly conjured up. Presumably, many of the works initially cre-
ated in outer space will be considered unpublished, but we cannot
discount the possibility that in the near future, copyrightable works
created in outer space will be disseminated to a sufficient number of
people such that a court will find them to have been published.
Where unpublished works are concerned, it appears that the coun-
try of origin will be the United States if all the authors are U.S.
nationals, and the registration requirement will be triggered. In a
multinational space station, however, it is safe to assume that per-
sons of different nationalities may be involved in authoring works.
With regard to published works, some determination seems neces-
sary as to whether publication aboard a United States space object
is publication "in the United States" for purposes of the copyright
laws; this definition could be important to the registration and de-
posit requirements. Similarly, a declaration is needed as to whether
publication aboard a space object registered by a Berne nation is
considered publication in that country.387
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id. § 411.
385. Id.; see also id. §§ 412, 505, and 506(c) (copyright registration prerequisite to statu-
tory damages and attorney's fees).
386. 17 U.S.C. § 407.
387. International intergovernmental organizations that carry space objects on their own
registry may pose problems in this regard, particularly if jurisdiction is assigned by registry,
and the organization includes both Berne and non-Berne treaty nations.
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V. CONCLUSION
As recent events demonstrate, increased commercial activity in
outer space is rapidly creating a concrete need for patent protection
in outer space ventures. Although a colorable argument can be
made that United States patent jurisdiction already extends to the
activity aboard United States spacecraft, continued private invest-
ment in space ventures requires the certainty of congressional ac-
tion. Accordingly, the passage of the proposed patent legislation
now before Congress is critical to any continued policy of outer
space commercialization. The proposed patent legislation is not it-
self entirely free from ambiguity, and fails to address intellectual
property protection beyond patenting. Nonetheless, it represents a
foundation upon which future enactments can and should be added.
